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WHY CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ARE SO DIFFERENT:  
A FORGOTTEN HISTORY 
Ion Meyn* 
 
Much has been written about the origins of civil procedure.  Yet little is 
known about the origins of criminal procedure, even though it governs how 
millions of cases in federal and state courts are litigated each year.  This 
Article’s examination of criminal procedure’s origin story questions the 
prevailing notion that civil and criminal procedure require different 
treatment.  The Article’s starting point is the first draft of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure—confidential in 1941 and since forgotten.  The draft 
reveals that reformers of criminal procedure turned to the new rules of civil 
procedure for guidance.  The contents of this draft shed light on an 
extraordinary moment:  reformers initially proposed that all litigation in the 
United States, civil and criminal, be governed by a unified procedural code.  
The implementation of this original vision of a unified code would have had 
dramatic implications for how criminal law is practiced and perceived today.  
The advisory committee’s final product in 1944, however, set criminal 
litigation on a very different course.  Transcripts of the committee’s initial 
meetings reveal that the final code of criminal procedure emerged from the 
clash of ideas presented by two committee members, James Robinson and 
Alexander Holtzoff.  Holtzoff’s traditional views would ultimately persuade 
other members, cleaving criminal procedure from civil procedure. 
Since then, differences in civil and criminal litigation have become 
entrenched and normalized.  Yet, at the time the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure were drafted, a unified code was not just a plausible alternative 
but the only proposal.  The draft’s challenge to the prevailing notion that 
civil and criminal wrongs inherently require different procedural treatment 
is a critical contribution to the growing debate over whether the absence of 
discovery in criminal procedure is justified in light of discovery tools 
afforded by civil procedure.  The first draft of criminal procedure, which 
called for uniform rules to govern proceedings in all civil and criminal 
courtrooms, suggests the possibility that current resistance to unification is, 
to a significant degree, historically contingent. 
 
*  Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School.  The author expresses special 
thanks to Joseph Hoffmann, Carissa Hessick, Brad Snyder, David Schwartz, Daniel 
McConkie, Brooke Coleman, Anthony O’Rourke, Howard Erlanger, Miriam Seifter, Russell 
Gold, and Sandra Mayson for their close review and insights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Spurred by the reform of federal civil procedure that transformed litigation 
in 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court appointed an advisory committee to draft 
the first Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in February 1941.  Over the 
next six months, committee Reporter James J. Robinson and his staff sifted 
through public commentary and existing law to create a new set of rules 
governing criminal disputes.  Confidential and never publicly circulated, this 
first draft was ultimately forgotten.1  What it reveals, however, is 
extraordinary:  the original conception of the Federal Code of Criminal 
Procedure integrated the rules of civil procedure.  The advisory committee 
had drafted a unified code of procedure that would have governed all 
litigation in federal courts, civil and criminal, and which would have 
influenced reform in the majority of states. 
The committee’s final product in 1944, however, fundamentally differed 
from its original draft.  As a result, criminal litigation was placed on a vastly 
different course than civil litigation.  A transcript of the first meetings 
provides a window into what led to this divergence—a clash between the 
views of Robinson and Alexander Holtzoff, the committee’s secretary.2  
 
 1. The draft was found with the expert assistance of reference librarian Kris Turner at 
the University of Wisconsin Law School and his counterpart at Harvard Law School.  The 
copy was discovered in the collection left by Sheldon Glueck, an influential law professor at 
Harvard.  Glueck served on the advisory committee appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1941 to draft the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appointment of Advisory Comm. on 
Rules in Criminal Cases, 312 U.S. 717 (1941). 
 2. These transcripts are retained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 
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Robinson’s proposal would have retained the parallelism between civil and 
criminal procedure that had persisted for centuries at common law.  Because 
recent reform to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had transformed 
litigation, Robinson’s approach would have been equally transformative.  
Holtzoff, in contrast, sought to preserve existing practices and resisted, in 
large degree, any course correction.  Because Holtzoff persuaded others on 
the committee of his view, the resulting reform effort of criminal procedure 
did not embrace change, but resisted it.  The repercussions were enormous, 
as many states adopted the federal template as their own.3 
Given the committee’s ultimate decision to reject a unified code, litigating 
civil and criminal matters is now different, and starkly so.  To compare 
modern criminal and civil procedure is not to compare apples to oranges, but, 
as David A. Sklansky and Stephen C. Yeazell observed, to compare 
“tangerines [to] socket wrenches.”4  Where civil procedure gives parties 
agency by affording them formal power to investigate facts, criminal 
procedure deems a criminal defendant a passive participant who makes 
choices based on information managed by the prosecutor.  And where civil 
litigation can generate significant pretrial disputes, criminal procedure 
permits less friction and is protective of state leverage.  The design of 
criminal procedure facilitates prosecution—from charging to sentencing.  
The efficiency of the criminal process, however, threatens the quality of 
information that supports prosecutions and facilitates the high-volume 
processing associated with mass incarceration. 
Despite the significant consequences of its procedural design, there is 
surprisingly little understanding of criminal procedure’s origin.  Yet the 
practice of criminal procedure is now entrenched.  As a consequence, 
scholars bold enough to question the differences between civil and criminal 
procedure do so tentatively.  For example, when Sklansky and Yeazell 
recently asked whether the two codes might benefit from some degree of 
cross-pollination, they framed their inquiry cautiously.  They stated, “[w]e 
certainly do not contend that civil and criminal cases have no important 
differences and should be treated the same,” adding that any careless 
comparison could be “dangerously misleading” and ignore “large 
differences.”5  The original design of federal criminal procedure, however, 
demonstrates that these “large differences” were not inevitable or even the 
most likely outcome.6  The current iteration of criminal procedure was in fact 
the alternate, later-considered option.  The initial draft envisioned a unified 
code that would shape and govern all litigation in the United States.  Legal 
scholars continue to question the procedural boundary between civil and 
 
 3. See Jerold H. Israel, On Recognizing Variations in State Criminal Procedure, 15 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 485 (1982) (observing that more than half of state criminal procedure 
codes are influenced by federal reform). 
 4. David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home:  
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 684 
(2006). 
 5. Id. at 685. 
 6. Id. 
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criminal disputes,7 and some jurisdictions begin to permit the infiltration of 
civil procedure into criminal disputes.8  This Article’s historical findings 
further destabilize the prevailing notion that civil and criminal wrongs 
inherently require different procedural treatment. 
Part I of this Article describes the procedural path shared by civil and 
criminal disputes at common law and surveys various criticisms of common 
law.  This background reveals that civil and criminal disputes were more alike 
than different.  Part II then charts the path of how civil procedure reformers 
turned to equitable principles to reimagine dispute resolution and, in turn, 
how these changes led reformers to consider similar changes to criminal 
procedure.  Part III is the heart of this Article:  source material that was 
confidential at the time of drafting reveals both that the first draft of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplated the integration of civil 
 
 7. See generally Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of 
Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585 (2005) (favoring reforms that 
integrate civil discovery tools into criminal adjudication); Russell M. Gold et al., Civilizing 
Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (proposing integration of civil 
discovery rules to inform plea bargaining); Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. 
L. REV. 87 (2017) (challenging presumptions over the demarcation between civil and criminal 
disputes); Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness:  The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 
79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091 (2014) [hereinafter Meyn, Discovery and Darkness] (analyzing 
discovery procedures available to civil and criminal law litigants); Ion Meyn, The Unbearable 
Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39 (2014) [hereinafter Meyn, Unbearable 
Lightness] (comparing each pretrial moment, through a procedural lens, in civil and criminal 
disputes); Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery:  Why Old Objections Must Yield to 
New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541 (proposing depositions for criminal cases); Jenny 
Roberts, Too Little, Too Late:  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and 
Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2004) (observing that the 
low community standard that defines adequacy of counsel in criminal cases is linked to the 
lack of discovery available in criminal cases); Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming 
Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79 (2008) (challenging justifications for a civil and 
criminal procedural divide).  This recent scholarship follows earlier efforts to provide a critical 
lens as to differences between civil and criminal procedure, beginning with Jerome Hall’s 
foundational piece. See Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 
YALE L.J. 723, 723 (1942); see also Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal 
Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 316 (1960) (questioning the lack of discovery in criminal 
disputes); Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused:  Balance of Advantage in 
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1192 (1960) (advocating for the creation of “a free 
deposition and discovery procedure”). 
 8. See Darryl K. Brown, Discovery in State Criminal Justice, in ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE:  
A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (Erik Luna ed., forthcoming 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2951166 [https://perma.cc/7A2J-
ZWE7] (surveying jurisdictions that have integrated civil discovery rules into criminal codes); 
Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2982512 
[https://perma.cc/K3WU-9GAG]; Meyn, Discovery and Darkness, supra note 7, at 1110 
(identifying the minority of state jurisdictions that permit depositions in criminal cases); Jenia 
I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases:  An 
Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 288 & n.5, 302–06 (2016) (finding that 
though ten states have “closed-file” policies, twenty-three states are experimenting with 
broadening the disclosure obligations of prosecutors, while seventeen other states have 
adopted “open-file” policies with liberal disclosure obligations); id. at 289 (“While discovery 
rules continue to vary significantly from state to state, a recent trend has been in the direction 
of earlier and broader discovery.”). 
2017] CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 701 
rules and that reformers saw a unified code of procedure as the path forward.  
Based on the original draft and transcripts of the first committee meetings, 
Part III traces how the committee uncoupled civil from criminal procedure.  
Finally, Part IV suggests that certain factors may have contributed to this 
outcome, including institutional bias, gravitation toward existing practices, 
and a lack of any explicit objectives to lead reform.  The Article concludes 
that this origin story destabilizes the prevailing conception that criminal 
disputes require different procedural treatment than civil disputes. 
I.  THE COMMON LAW:  
CREATING COMMON CAUSE FOR REFORM 
For centuries, criminal and civil disputes shared a similar procedural 
pathway.9  Governed by the common law, civil and criminal disputes 
occurred in two stages:  pleading and trial.10  Criminal and civil litigants were 
required to present a single issue against a single defendant in accordance 
with precise, unyielding language.11  This deep structure of common law was 
exported to the United States, preserving a procedural parallelism.12  “[T]he 
rules and principles of pleading with respect to . . . a civil action are 
applicable to [a criminal] indictment,” wrote William L. Clark in 1918; 
 
 9. Emerging from the Magna Carta, common law procedures replaced trials by ordeal 
and the arbitrary pronouncements of local elders, establishing a consistency in rights and 
remedies that bound peasants, clergy, and the king alike. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law:  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 916 (1987).  There was virtue in the common law’s conservatism:  the 
principle that only “specific facts would trigger specific legal consequences” resisted the 
arbitrary application of law and the justice-distorting pressures of social networks, class, and 
political power. Id.   
 10. See JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 13–
14 (1969); BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 8–9 (3d ed. 1923); 
Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 347, 350–
52 (2003).  The pleadings stage determined whether a plaintiff had a cognizable claim and, if 
so, endeavored to identify precisely the dispute’s legal and factual topography. See Charles E. 
Clark, History, Systems, and Functions of Pleading, 5 AM. L. SCH. REV. 716, 717 (1926). 
 11. See Stubblefield v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W. 444, 445 (Ky. 1923) (noting that the 
particularities of pleading in criminal law “emanated from the extreme technical exactness of 
the common law with reference to pleading in both civil and criminal causes”); 1 JAMES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 508 (MacMillan & Co. 
ed. 1883); Franklin G. Fessenden, Improvement in Criminal Pleading, 10 HARV. L. REV. 98, 
99 (1896) (“As in ancient days the test was whether the case could be brought to fit the writ, 
so now the inquiry many times is whether the case fits the form of indictment.”); see also 
Tomlinson v. Territory, 33 P. 950, 952 (N.M. 1893) (“There being but one count in the 
indictment, not more than one offense could properly be proved.  It is a principle of common-
law pleading, applicable to both civil and criminal cases, that all pleadings must be single.”); 
Ronald Hamowy, F.A. Hayek and the Common Law, 23 CATO J. 241, 248 (2003) (describing 
pleading requirements as to civil disputes); Subrin, supra note 9, at 915.  As to the reference 
to “litigants,” until the professionalization of police and the rise of public prosecutors in the 
late 1800s, it was most common for a private citizen to serve as a plaintiff in criminal law 
actions. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 424 (5th ed. 
1956).   
 12. See WILLIAM L. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE viii–x (William E. 
Mikell ed., 2d ed. 1918) (indicating there are two stages, pleading and trial); Subrin, supra 
note 9, at 926–27. 
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“where the criminal law is silent as to the form of an indictment in a particular 
case,” a litigant could look to “pleading in civil actions” for guidance.13 
The desire to reform civil and criminal procedure responded to a shared 
criticism.  A state court commented in 1923 that criticism “emanated from 
the extreme technical exactness of the common law with reference to 
pleading in both civil and criminal causes.”14  Individual efforts of any 
attorney to improve the clarity of pleadings presented great risks:  “[t]he 
pleader is fearful lest, in departing from time-honored forms, he may put the 
[case] in peril of failure.”15  To the plaintiff or the prosecutor, the pleading 
phase might have felt like a sword fight in a minefield; one’s own step could 
be as fatal as the opponent’s attack.16  Examples abound.  For a 
Massachusetts prosecutor, alleging that a crime took place “on the fifteenth 
day of July, 1855” was deemed insufficient for lacking guidance as to the 
era—was it “B.C.” or “A.D.?”17  A North Carolina prosecutor’s description 
of killing an animal in the “field of another” deviated too much from “in an 
enclosure not surrounded by a lawful fence,” the required language.18  In a 
civil action alleging the defendant broke two gates and three hedges, the 
plaintiff fatally failed to specify later in the complaint that the defendant had 
broken the “aforesaid” gates and hedges.19  The advance to trial was thus 
vulnerable to a judge using a technical defect to stall or dismiss the case. 
These technicalities seemed intractable.  Subject to a slow trajectory of 
growth, the common law also resisted change.  A treatise in 1918 observed 
that “[n]o inconsiderable portion of the difficulties in the way of the criminal 
pleader, at common law, have been removed . . . in most of the states in the 
American Union.”20  Criticism of common law procedure, however, only 
gained momentum.  “[L]egal procedure,” wrote Professor Hugh E. Willis in 
 
 13. CLARK, supra note 12, at 158. 
 14. Stubblefield, 246 S.W. at 445. 
 15. Fessenden, supra note 11, at 99.  Indicative of the treacherous waters faced by 
prosecutors, Francis Wharton’s 1918 treatise warned that if a statute criminalizing escape used 
the words “[f]eloniously and unlawfully,” a prosecutor’s failure to state these exact words 
would be fatal to the indictment. 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
793 (James M. Kerr ed., 10th ed. 1918). 
 16. CLARK, supra note 12, at 157–217.  Expressing a similar sentiment, Frederick Pollock, 
a correspondent of Oliver Wendell Holmes, wrote in 1912,  
Perverse ingenuity, once let loose on the art of pleading, went . . . from bad to 
worse . . . .  [A] strictly logical adherence to consequences would have brought the 
business of the Courts to a dead-lock . . . .  In many cases there were alternative 
forms of procedure having different incidents wholly unconnected with the 
substance of the case . . . [and] it was often difficult to be sure what the proper form 
of action was. 
Frederick Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 387 (1912). 
 17. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OR NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAW OF PLEADING AND EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 220 (4th ed. 1895). 
 18. Id. at 228 & n.5 (discussing State v. Staton, 66 N.C. 640 (1872)).  Bishop provided 
another example:  merely alleging that a person broke and entered into a house would 
disqualify an indictment that required the language “dwelling-house of another.” Id. at 346.  
 19. HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 
333–34 (1871). 
 20. WHARTON, supra note 15, at 183. 
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1922, “has [become] an end.”21  Capturing the sense that common law could 
not attend to the sweeping changes of the industrial age, one commentator 
wrote, “We have made wonderful improvements in discoveries and 
inventions to save time . . . but in the courts we still move as slowly as the 
travelers that in olden times creeped along in oxcarts and canal-boats.”22  
Common law’s rigidity and its prohibitions on joinder could not attend to 
the growth of complex legal relationships between government, individuals, 
and enterprise—or to the growth of organized crime.23  If a litigant survived 
the pleading gauntlet, parties faced a pretrial lacuna, as there was no formal 
period of discovery and investigation.  Parties instead looked toward the trial 
horizon in darkness.  At trial, parties presented surprise documents and 
witnesses that had not been subjected to any meaningful pretrial evaluation.  
Add to this frustration the procedural variances between neighboring 
jurisdictions, and the drumbeat for reform quickened.  As one writer stated, 
“No petty tinkering, here and there, with existing law will suffice.  Our codes 
and statutes as to procedure should not be minute.  They should give the 
courts more latitude in making flexible rules and in exercising a reasonable 
discretion.”24  By the mid-nineteenth century, notable statewide efforts began 
to present viable alternatives to the common law’s cabined approach as 
reformers proposed the integration of equitable principles “to escape 
procedural restraints in order to do substantive justice.”25 
II.  CIVIL PROCEDURE REFORM 
In response to criticism of common law, civil reformers looked to equity 
for innovation.  Courts of equity had developed in tandem with common law 
disputes, relieving civil litigants from “an alleged injustice that would result 
from rigorous application of the common law” by providing alternative 
procedures and remedies.26  By disposing of the jury, equity courts could 
exercise significant discretion in determining substantive and factual issues 
 
 21. Hugh E. Willis, Proposed Procedural Reform, 5 ILL. L.Q. 17, 20 (1922). 
 22. E.J. McDermott, Delays and Reversals on Technical Grounds in Civil and Criminal 
Trials, 45 AM. L. REV. 356, 356 (1911). 
 23. See Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE 
L.J. 387, 390–91 (1935). 
 24. McDermott, supra note 22, at 369. 
 25. Subrin, supra note 9, at 926. 
 26. Id. at 918.  Courts of equity did not resolve criminal cases—rather, the state brought 
a criminal case, and the state was limited to bringing actions and pursuing remedies that were 
provided for by statute. See, e.g., Taylor v. Woods, 52 Ala. 474, 478 (1875) (“All causes, 
whether in equity or at law, had but two grand classifications, civil and criminal.  The latter 
comprehends only violations of the criminal law—causes at the common law, in which the 
crown, or with us the State, complains of violated law and broken peace, in which all 
individual right and interest are lost, and merged in the greater right and interest of the 
sovereign.”); Johnson v. State, 171 S.W. 1128, 1132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914) (Davidson, J., 
dissenting) (“I have been taught from the time I studied equity jurisprudence that there is a 
rule of equity, not criminal law, the substance of which is that he who seeks equity must come 
into court with clean hands or do equity.  In that instance the plaintiff or complaining party is 
seeking equity in a civil matter.  It cannot be a criminal prosecution.  The rules of equity are 
resorted to in civil matters when the law has failed of remedies.  It is fundamental that a 
criminal prosecution is not an equity case.”). 
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at any point of the litigation, blurring boundaries between pleading and trial.  
Courts sitting in equity compelled parties to appear and answer questions 
before trial, presaging the deposition.27  Equity courts invited parties to 
furnish the backstory to disagreements to inform decision-making.  Set free 
from the common law’s “search for a single issue,”28 disputes could absorb 
“as many [i]ssues of [l]aw or of [f]act as the [p]leaders desired.”29 
These innovations inspired efforts to reform civil procedure.  In 1879, 
Connecticut ambitiously merged equity and law, initiated a lawsuit through 
a “simple statement of pleading,” and permitted joinder of parties and claims 
that arose from the same transaction.30  More modest in scope but influencing 
reform in thirty states, David Dudley Field spearheaded an effort to replace 
common law’s issue pleading with “code pleading” in 1848.31  The Field 
Code discarded pleading requirements as it erected new ones; it abandoned 
forms of action and technical terms of art, and a plaintiff now pleaded 
“ultimate facts,” leading to disputes over whether a fact was ultimate, 
evidentiary, or conclusory.32  Complicating the picture, legislative attempts 
to modify the Field Code drew criticism for undermining cohesion between 
rules.33  These unpopular incursions led some commentators to conclude that 
the legislature had “neither the time nor the facilities to inquire into detailed 
problems of judicial procedure or to formulate complete codes.”34 
 
 27. Subrin, supra note 9, at 919. 
 28. Id. 
 29. KOFFLER & REPPY, supra note 10, at 519. 
 30. William C. Bruce, Joinder of Claims, Parties, and Counterclaims:  A Proposal for 
Revision of the Connecticut Provisions, 51 CONN. B.J. 354, 365 (1977); see also Report of 
Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law, 19 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 411, 425 
(1896). 
 31. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE:  A MODERN APPROACH 118 (5th ed. 
2009).  Code pleading jurisdictions required plaintiffs to plead the “ultimate facts” that were 
essential to the underlying legal claim, as opposed to “mere evidence,” a distinction that 
resulted in much litigation and disagreement over the specificity of facts required to make a 
valid claim. Id. at 123. 
 32. Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 
450 (1958) (“The intent and effect of the rules [of civil procedure] is to permit the claim to be 
stated in general terms; the rules are designed to discourage battles over mere form of 
statement and to sweep away the needless controversies which the codes permitted that served 
either to delay trial on the merits or to prevent a party from having a trial because of mistakes 
in statement.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8 advisory committee’s note to 1955 proposed 
amendment)); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort:  The Origins of a 
General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 454–55 (1990) (discussing the 
significance of the Field Code’s reforms). 
 33. See Homer Cummings, The New Criminal Rules—Another Triumph of the Democratic 
Process, 31 A.B.A. J. 236, 236 (1945) (“As a result of amendments passed by the legislature 
from year to year, the original [Field] Code became so burdened with detailed requirements 
that it practically broke down of its own weight.”). 
 34. George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:  1, 55 YALE L.J. 
694, 702 (1946); see also Clark, supra note 32, at 443 (stating that, prior to reform in 1938, 
“constant amendments of procedure by the legislature were all too well known; they were 
perhaps the most prominent argument for reform”).  Those practicing criminal law shared 
similar feelings. See Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States:  
Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 76th Cong. 8–9 (1939) 
[hereinafter Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2]. 
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As statewide reforms responded to the criticisms of common law 
procedure,35 the New Deal ethos of centralized social reform and reliance on 
expertise to shape policy provided additional impetus to turn over reform to 
the judiciary.36  In 1934, Congress enabled the Supreme Court to achieve 
uniformity through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.37  The Court had 
discretion in how to proceed.  It could have codified existing practices or 
drafted an entirely new set of rules, and it could have done so through broad 
consensus or in relative secrecy.  Yale Law School Dean Charles E. Clark 
viewed an insular drafting process as critical to reimagining a code that would 
“meet the needs of an increasingly complex social organization for efficient 
and workable court machinery.”38  Clark sought to avoid the repackaging of 
existing practices, believing an insular approach would facilitate intellectual 
freedom in the absence of a constant reminder of perceived constraints.39 
Clark’s predictions seemed to bear out:  the Court appointed a committee 
that produced innovative rules through a series of confidential meetings.  
Clark, who served as the committee’s reporter, took cues from statewide 
efforts as the committee merged law and equity.40  Stephen N. Subrin 
succinctly identified significant features of the new rules of civil procedure:  
“ease of pleading,” “broad joinder,” “expansive [pretrial] discovery,” 
“greater judicial power and discretion,” “control over juries,” “reliance on 
professional experts,” “reliance on documentation,” and “disengagement of 
substance, procedure, and remedy.”41 
The new code resisted tradition and instead favored resolution on the 
merits.42  The procedural gulf between pleading and trial was replaced by a 
robust discovery phase; this new stage became the heart of litigation, as it 
 
 35. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 272 (1989). 
 36. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438 n.2 (2011); 
Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA 
L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1997). 
 37. See 28 U.S.C. § 723(b)–(c) (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)); Clark, 
supra note 32, at 436. 
 38. Clark & Moore, supra note 23, at 387. 
 39. See Clark, supra note 32, at 445–46.  Clark thought criticism should come after, not 
during, the moment of creation. Id. 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (amended 2007) (“There shall be one form of action to be 
known as ‘civil action.’”). 
 41. Subrin, supra note 9, at 923–24; see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (1938) (amended 2007) 
(“All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, 
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any questions of law or fact common to all of 
them will arise in the action.”). 
 42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (1938) (amended 2007) (“A civil action is commenced by filing 
a complaint with the court.”); id. 8(a) (“A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall 
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief . . . .”); id. 8(e)(1) (“Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.  
No technical forms of pleading or motions are required.”); id. 12(b) (amended 1946, 1963, 
2007) (“Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for a relief in any pleading . . . shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading . . . .”). 
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permitted parties to scrutinize factual and legal assertions.43  The rules 
challenged assumptions about judicial neutrality, permitting courts to shape 
pretrial proceedings.44  A summary judgment motion allowed scrutiny of 
factual allegations and afforded judges the authority to dismiss claims.45  
Such a demanding process potentially facilitated informed settlement talks.  
Trial by surprise gave way to a new regime that promoted factual 
transparency and more searching trials.46  By 1938, the Supreme Court sent 
this version to Congress, leading to the adoption of the new Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure that would transform litigation. 
III.  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM 
Civil procedure reform created the necessary impetus, and the potential 
architecture, for the reform of criminal procedure.  As with civil procedure, 
states had made efforts to confront criticisms of the common law.47  But after 
the transformation of civil litigation in 1938, House Representative Frances 
Walter observed that congressional reform of criminal procedure was 
virtually inevitable.48  He found allies in the U.S. Department of Justice.  
Assistant Attorney General Brian McMahon testified that in some 
jurisdictions, pleading technicalities might require a forty-page indictment.49  
Former Attorney General Homer Cummings observed that a lack of statutory 
 
 43. See id. 26–31, 33–36, 45 (amended 2007).  Clark’s views on civil procedure were 
shaped by legal realism:  his preference for data-driven judicial decisions led to his embrace 
of, and advocacy for, a robust pretrial discovery period. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the 
Boundaries of a Dispute:  Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the 
Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 80–89 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions 
Allowed:  The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
691, 711 (1998); Subrin, supra note 9, at 967–68. 
 44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1938) (amended 2007). 
 45. See id. 56. 
 46. See id. 26, 30–36. 
 47. See, e.g., State v. Hliboka, 78 P. 965, 967 (Mont. 1904) (noting legislative efforts to 
change civil and criminal pleading “to do away with the mere forms and technicalities of the 
common law”); State v. Womack, 29 P. 939, 941 (Wash. 1892) (observing that recent 
legislative efforts had sought to facilitate the use of a “plain statement” in pleading so as to 
address the distortions to justice that resulted from “the technicalities and cobwebs and 
mysticisms of the common law”).  Initial reform efforts did not escape strict pleading formulas 
but merely mitigated them.  For example, as to indictments that required “an averment as to 
money, or bullion or gold dust[,] . . . treasury notes or certificates, banknotes or other 
securities[,] . . . checks, drafts[,] or bills of exchange,” the American Law Institute proposed 
in 1931 that it should be sufficient to describe such things as “money, without specifying the 
particular character, number, denomination, kind, species, or nature thereof.” State v. Peke, 
371 P.2d 226, 232 (N.M. 1962). 
 48. See Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2, supra note 34, at 35. 
Rep. Walter: With the rules adopted in civil practice in the way they have 
been we cannot, very well not enact this resolution. 
Rep. Robinson: That is because the civil rules have been so well received? 
Rep. Walter:  Yes. 
Rep. Robinson: That this would follow along, yes; I think so. 
Id. 
 49. Id. at 10. 
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guidance on criminal procedure led to inconsistencies.50  Assistant Attorney 
General Alexander Holtzoff emphasized the lack of uniformity.51  And New 
York University Law Professor Arthur T. Vanderbilt told Congress that “the 
system of criminal procedure is even more backward and primitive than has 
been the case with civil procedure.”52  Consistent with the conclusions of 
civil reformers, proponents of criminal procedure reform thought the 
judiciary best suited to create rules of procedure.53  In 1940, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the American Law Institute, “I am hopeful 
that the Congress will make provision for the regulation and simplification 
of Federal criminal procedure by means of judicial rule making, similar to 
that made by it several years ago in respect to Federal procedure.”54  That 
year, Congress passed legislation that gave the Supreme Court authority to 
draft rules of criminal procedure.55 
The influence of civil procedure reform continued to be evident.  The 
Supreme Court delegated its drafting authority to a new advisory committee 
to follow a course “so successfully employed by the earlier advisory 
committee on Rules of Civil Procedure.”56  The Supreme Court appointed 
Professor Vanderbilt as chairman,57 Professor James J. Robinson as reporter 
 
 50. Id. at 8. 
 51. Id. at 9 (citing Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879)).  During the hearing, Holtzoff 
read a passage penned by Supreme Court Justice Nathan Clifford:   
Examined in the most favorable light, [criminal procedure] is a mere jumble of 
Federal law, common law, and State law, consisting of incongruous and 
irreconcilable regulations which, in legal effect, amount to no more than a direction 
to the judge sitting in such a criminal trial to conduct the same as well as he can, in 
view of the three systems of criminal jurisprudence. 
Id.  The rules of criminal procedure governing federal disputes in 1930 varied by jurisdiction. 
See James J. Robinson, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 27 J. AM. 
JUDICATURE SOC’Y 38, 42 (1943).  And the Conformity Act required federal courts to follow 
common law rules unique to the state in which the federal court presided. See Hearings Before 
Subcomm. No. 2, supra note 34, at 4, 8.  Federal courts were also subject to constitutional 
constraints and a few federal statutes that affected “joinder of counts in an indictment; the 
effect of a judgment on demurrer; procedure in removal hearings; the issuance of search 
warrants and similar narrow procedural provisions.” Id. at 8. 
 52. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2, supra note 34, at 2. 
 53. See id. at 8–9, 16, 23.  Foreshadowing disagreements unique to criminal reform, some 
commentators raised concerns that shifting rulemaking authority to courts risked disrupting 
prosecutorial power. Id. at 16, 23. 
 54. Homer Cummings, The New Criminal Rules—Another Triumph of the Democratic 
Process, 31 A.B.A. J. 236, 238 (1945). 
 55. See 18 U.S.C. § 687 (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)). 
 56. Dession, supra note 34, at 695. 
 57. Register of the Arthur T. Vanderbilt Political, Professional, and Judicial Papers, 
1902–1957, WESLEYAN U., https://www.wesleyan.edu/libr/schome/FAs/VA1000-186.xml 
[https://perma.cc/T8GF-JM6U] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017); see also Jim H. Smith, Arthur T. 
Vanderbilt II ‘72:  The Legacy of His Grandfather—and of Professor Clement Vose, 
WESLEYAN MAG. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://magazine.wesleyan.edu/2014/12/10/arthur-t-
vanderbilt-ii-72-the-legacy-of-his-grandfather-and-of-professor-clement-vose 
[https://perma.cc/AV5P-TED9].  Vanderbilt was a descendent of magnate Cornelius, “The 
Commodore.” See Anne Chisholm, More Money Than Anyone Else, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/24/books/more-money-than-anyone-else.html 
[https://perma.cc/HR72-52EV].  
708 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
and special assistant to the U.S. Attorney General’s Office, and Alexander 
Holtzoff as secretary.58 
A.  The First Draft:  A Unified Code of Procedure 
In February of 1941, Reporter James Robinson and his staff began working 
up the first draft of criminal procedure.59  Robinson served as a prosecutor 
and was on active duty with the U.S. Navy before joining academia.60  The 
year before he was appointed to be reporter, Robinson served as chairman of 
the American Bar Association’s section of criminal law.  In this role, he 
advocated for the A.B.A. to “exert a serious leadership against crime and for 
common sense and efficiency in criminal law administration.”61  Robinson’s 
staff was filled with members of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Offices 
of the Assistant U.S. Attorney, and the National Association of U.S. 
Attorneys.62  Over the course of six months, Robinson and his team made a 
crucial decision:  the organization and content of the draft would be anchored 
in the newly reformed civil rules. 
In moving toward a unified code, Robinson’s team acknowledged the 
diversity of possible approaches.  To each proposed rule, the team considered 
laws, standards, and commentary.  The first draft, for example, proposed a 
rule that required civil and criminal rules to be interpreted in the same way; 
to this rule, the committee appended Federal Judge W. Calvin Chestnut’s 
comments in opposition, as well as comments in support from the Judicial 
 
 58. See Judge Matthew F. McGuire, Judge Alexander Holtzoff—A Vignette, D.C. B.J., 
Mar.–Sept. 1973, at 17.  Serving the committee in nonleadership positions were former New 
York Court of Appeals Judge Frederick E. Crane and Federal District Judge Hugh D. 
McClellan; attorneys George Z. Medalie, Leland Tolman, Gordon E. Dean, G. Aaron 
Youngquist, George J. Burke, George F. Longsdorf, Murray Seasongood, and J.O. Seth; and 
law professors Sheldon Glueck (Harvard), George H. Dession (Yale), Herbert Wechsler 
(Columbia), John Barker Waite (University of Michigan), and Lester B. Orfield (University 
of Nebraska). Dession, supra note 34, at 695 n.9. 
 59. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The New Federal Criminal Rules, 51 YALE L.J. 719, 720 (1942) 
(“[T]he Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure commenced its work in 
February, 1941 . . . .”). 
 60. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2, supra note 34, at 35; Leon H. Wallace, Dedication:  
James J. Robinson, 50 IND. L.J. 648, 648 (1974); Indiana Governor Is After Vigilantes, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 14, 1921, at 2; James J. Robinson Dies, Libyan High Court Judge, WASH. POST 
(May 25, 1980), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1980/05/25/james-j-
robinson-dies-libyan-high-court-judge/3d005f12-b648-4b46-8c25-3d621a7c481d/ 
[https://perma.cc/7XA7-872V].  Robinson would later serve as a prosecutor in the Tokyo war 
crimes trials after World War II. The People of the IMTFE, U. VA. L. LIBR. , 
http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/people#2326 [https://perma.cc/X3M7-JNGC] (last visited Oct. 
16, 2017). 
 61. James J. Robinson, Report of the Chairman, A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. L. PROGRAM & COMM. 
REP., July 1939, at 10, 14. 
 62. Robinson, supra note 51, at 44.  In fact, the majority of Supreme Court Justices at that 
time had previously served the in Department of Justice, including Justices Felix Frankfurter, 
Charles Hughes, James McReynolds, Stanley Reed, Owen Roberts, and Harlan Stone. See 
TOM W. CAMPBELL, FOUR SCORE FORGOTTEN MEN:  SKETCHES OF JUSTICES OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT 333, 364–65, 381 (1950); PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR AND OFFICERS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, NOVEMBER 4, 1949, at 95 (1950); Charles C. 
Burlingham, Harlan Fiske Stone, 32 A.B.A. J. 322, 323 (1946); Note, Mr. Justice Reed—
Swing Man or Not?, 1 STAN L. REV. 714, 715 (1949).  
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Conference of the Fifth Circuit and the Committee for the Southern District 
of Florida, which had no objection to the “Uniformity of Criminal Procedure 
with Civil Procedure.”63  As to proposed rules that provided for pretrial 
conferences and discovery, the draft included an assistant U.S. attorney’s 
comment that a prosecutor should not be required to “disclose information 
that might be harmful to the trial of the government case”64 and also included 
comments in support of permitting a judge to hold pretrial conferences65 and 
providing depositions to defendants.66 
The legal and political environment appeared amenable to integrating the 
substantive innovations of civil procedure reform.67  President Roosevelt 
thought reform of criminal procedure should look to civil reform, as it had 
been “met with general acclaim.”68  Professor Jerome Hall, a preeminent 
scholar of criminal procedure, provided a comprehensive justification for a 
unified code in his 1942 article in the Yale Law Journal.69  For Hall, civil 
reform had been responsive to procedure’s universal purpose:  to discover 
relevant information, fulfill the promise of substantive law, assess whether a 
defendant was liable under that law and, if so, to what degree.70  Hall viewed 
the civil code as a compendium of neutral rules and saw no reason that 
criminal litigation should not be subject to such treatment.71  “In general, as 
regards the purely technical rules, those that are neutral as to advantage, the 
new civil rules are always suggestive and sometimes can be applied almost 
literally to criminal procedure.”72  Hall highlighted the major innovations of 
civil rules—notice pleading, judicial management, and discovery—but found 
existing features of criminal procedure “primitive” by comparison.73  For 
Hall, civil and criminal disputes shared similar challenges and were 
accordingly susceptible to a similar solution. 
 
 63. Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure 
for the District Courts of the United States r. 2 note (Sept. 8, 1941) [hereinafter 1941 Draft 
Rules of Criminal Procedure] (tentative draft) (on file with author). 
 64. Id. r. 16 note (comments of Alexander Campbell, U.S. attorney for the Northern 
District of Indiana). 
 65. Id. (comments of the Committee for the District of Kansas) (suggesting that “the 
principle of pre-trial should be applied in criminal cases if that can be done without violating 
the Constitution”); see also id. (comments of the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit). 
 66. Id. r. 26. 
 67. Meanwhile, other commentators were alarmed by the widespread debate, arguing, for 
instance, that “the task of reforming civil procedure should be sharply distinguished from the 
task of improving criminal procedure” and that “[t]his distinction is not usually recognized.” 
Comment, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 50 YALE L.J. 107, 108 n.8 (1940). 
 68. Id. (“It is hoped this grant of power will result in introducing uniformity and simplicity 
in the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts and eliminating some of the 
archaic technicalities which at times hamper or delay the progress of cases through the 
courts. . . .  The Rules of Civil Procedure have met with general acclaim and have made an 
important contribution to reducing law’s delays and diminishing the cost of litigation.  It is 
reasonable to expect a similar result in criminal cases from the legislation just enacted.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.L.W. 2032 (1940)). 
 69. See Hall, supra note 7, at 739. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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Consistent with Hall’s views, Robinson’s team, apparently with Chairman 
Vanderbilt’s support, integrated civil rules into its first draft.74  Robinson 
wrote that in this draft the “criminal rules follow as closely as possible in 
organization, in numbering and in substance the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”75  Indeed, the draft tracks the civil code’s organization, with 
sections including scope, commencement, pleadings and motions, parties, 
discovery, and so forth.76  Similar to civil litigants entering unfamiliar 
territory with the introduction of the new civil procedure code, criminal law 
practitioners would view this new ordering as a radical departure from 
existing conceptions.77 
Though Robinson’s team integrated the majority of civil rules, they 
excepted those deemed incompatible with criminal disputes.78  The staff did 
not include civil rules like interpleader, class actions, and summary 
judgment.79  Any correspondence from Robinson explaining the basis for 
these omissions was not found.  He may have concluded that interpleader or 
class action rules were inapplicable where the pleading party is always a 
single entity (such as the state),80 and he may have determined summary 
 
 74. On the first day of the full committee, Chairman Vanderbilt said,  
I think the notion of keeping the parallel numbering of the two sets of rules, civil 
and criminal, is a splendid one.  I have a doubt in my own mind as to how it is going 
to work out, whether it may not mean too much warping and twisting of our rule, 
but I think we can start with it tentatively and see how it materializes. 
Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, United States 
Supreme Court at 17 (Sept. 8–10, 1941) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Hearing] (on file 
with author). 
 75. Id. at 5. 
 76. See generally 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63. 
 77. Charles Clark, in his approach to the civil rules, wrote “[e]xperience teaches us, 
that . . . the general professional reaction is, quite naturally, against change . . . .” Clark & 
Moore, supra note 23, at 390.  Indicative of this resistance to change, during the first day of 
the full committee’s meeting, member Sheldon Glueck continually expressed his discomfort 
with the first draft’s departure from the structure of the common law. See Advisory Committee 
Hearing, supra note 74, at 17, 257.  For example, Mr. Glueck suggested, “I think that most of 
us visualize this whole business as an orderly process, having certain traditional steps, and I 
think it might help if . . . some stress were placed on a chronological order of the subjects.” Id. 
at 257.  Committee member Crane responded that he agreed, but Holtzoff disagreed, saying, 
“I do not think, when we have the final draft, we need follow the numbering of the civil rules.” 
Id. 
 78. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 4; see also 1941 Draft Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, supra note 63 (letter from James J. Robinson to members of the advisory 
committee). 
 79. For example, the civil rule for interpleader (in which an interested third party may join 
as a plaintiff in the litigation) was not included, as only the government has the power to bring 
a criminal case. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 457.  Class actions permit 
a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit and represent similarly harmed but unnamed plaintiffs against a 
single defendant. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 80. The author was unable to locate correspondence or transcripts of meetings that might 
reveal the particular reasons why Robinson and his staff rejected certain rules.  There could 
be many other reasons to exclude class actions:  they usually are brought against the 
government for the violation of civil rights, or, otherwise, are brought against companies in 
mass tort cases.  In a criminal case against a corporation, there is little to stop a prosecutor 
from bringing multiple counts against a single corporate defendant for harming multiple 
victims.  Those victims might elect to bring a class action in a civil lawsuit for monetary 
damages and any injunctive relief.  In any case, subsequent Supreme Court decisions requiring 
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judgment was precluded by a defendant’s right to a jury trial.81  Robinson 
also made adjustments to some civil rules.  For example, Robinson resisted a 
full embrace of notice pleading; instead, he thought that a prosecutor should 
provide a defendant a minimum threshold of notice of the charges.82  
Robinson also preserved common law constraints on joinder, as opposed to 
civil procedure’s more permissive stance.83 
With these notable caveats, the first draft moved toward a unified code:  
there was a “fundamental principle” that guided the first draft, “that is, to 
follow as closely as possible the organization and so far as possible the 
content of the civil rule in preparing [each] criminal rule.”84  Given the 
receptivity to civil reform, Robinson thought tethering criminal and civil 
rules would confer legitimacy to criminal process: 
In the first place, the civil rules, as we know, have won a deserved prestige.  
There is no reason why the criminal rules might not well follow as closely 
as possible the plan and content of the civil rules and in that way gain some 
of the same confidence which has been afforded the civil rules.85 
 
individualization of criminal lawsuits would be in agreement with the committee’s exclusion 
of the class action from the criminal code. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in 
Criminal Cases, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 393 (2007) (“Aggregation remains a largely unused 
method of criminal adjudication in the United States.  Where core individual rights are at stake 
in criminal trials, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that every criminal defendant 
deserves an individual ‘day in court.’  The Court has accordingly developed a rigid set of rights 
that appear to preclude any significant aggregation of criminal cases.”).  This does not mean 
that aggregation in criminal law cases might always be inappropriate; as Garrett observes, it 
might be appropriate for defendants in a postconviction context to bring a class action against 
the state. See id.  Garrett’s observations also highlight the porous nature of criminal and civil 
procedure—in Wisconsin, for example, a postconviction criminal claim is considered a civil 
remedy. See, e.g., State v. Russo, No. 2009AP187, 2010 WL 1542426, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Apr. 20, 2010).  To certify a prosecutor as a class representative would provide an end-run 
around the requirement that every element of every allegation be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362–63 (1970), and would violate a defendant’s right 
to confront witnesses, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004). 
 81. A civil litigant is also entitled to a jury trial through the Seventh (as opposed to the 
Sixth) Amendment.  Recent scholarship calls into question the constitutionality of the 
summary judgment’s use in civil litigation because it derogates a civil party’s jury right. See, 
e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 140 
(2007); cf. Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the Constitutionality of Summary 
Judgment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 1 (2014).  Taking a different approach, Carrie Leonetti 
has proposed why a “defensive summary judgment” motion might be appropriate in criminal 
litigation. Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes:  A Proposal for Defensive 
Summary Judgment in Criminal Cases, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 670 (2011). 
 82. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 8.  For a full discussion 
of this rule, see infra Part III.B. 
 83. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 20.  Common law rules 
governing joinder in criminal disputes had gradually become less strict.  For instance, by 1918, 
joinder permitted several criminal defendants to be joined in the same indictment so long as 
they “join in the commission of an offense, whether it be a felony or a misdemeanor, . . . and 
one or all may be convicted.” CLARK, supra note 12, at 347. 
 84. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 4; see also 1941 Draft Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, supra note 63 (letter from James J. Robinson to members of the advisory 
committee). 
 85. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 4. 
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Robinson also recognized that legal assistance available to criminal 
defendants was suboptimal.  He envisioned a unified code providing a bridge 
between poor criminal defendants and better-resourced firms in civil 
litigation.  A unified code would erode perceived barriers to entry and expose 
criminal disputes to a larger market of litigators: 
I think it is the object of all of us to attract into the practice in criminal cases 
as many as possible of the lawyers whose practice frequently is exclusively 
on the civil side.  It would seem that it would be some contribution toward 
that end if the criminal rules can be made as closely as possible like the 
civil rules.86 
Robinson was aware that civil procedure reform, in encouraging factual 
development and transparency, would disrupt the existing balance of power 
between the prosecutor and the defendant and would alter the existing roles 
of litigants in a criminal dispute.  Yet Robinson was also aware that 
maintaining parallelism between civil and criminal procedure was a 
historically rooted approach, that the civil rules had been well received, and 
that Congress and the executive had instructed the committee to look to civil 
rules for guidance.  In his correspondence to the full committee, Robinson 
emphasized, “I want you to understand that this draft has been prepared with 
the idea of carrying that parallelism [to civil rules] as far as possible . . . .”87  
He encouraged members to offer “full and free criticism.”88  He was likely 
surprised at how fully and freely it came from one member, Alexander 
Holtzoff, who would prove to be the tip of the spear, if not the spear itself, in 
vanquishing Robinson’s vision.89 
B.  The Full Committee Considers a Unified Code 
The full committee met on September 8, 1941.90  The work of Robinson 
and his staff, which took six months to construct, was undone in four days.  
The transcripts of these first few meetings reveal how criminal procedure was 
severed from civil procedure, but they also indicate that the outcome was not 
inevitable.  James Robinson did not face a committee inherently opposed to 
his vision, but rather faced a powerful spokesperson who was wedded to 
existing practices and institutional norms:  Alexander Holtzoff.  Holtzoff 
dominated meetings, voicing his opinion on the first page and most of the 
800 pages that follow.91  He frequently attempted to frame the issue and guide 
the discussion on each rule, ready to offer a counterproposal that altered and 
often discarded the proposed civil rule. 
Though Holtzoff’s justifications for his positions were highly variable and 
sometimes self-contradictory, a pattern emerged:  he preferred existing 
common law practices over civil rules, unless the civil rule better facilitated 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 6. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1. 
 91. See id. 
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prosecution.  Robinson soon identified this pattern, even as Holtzoff raised 
other reasons to reject a civil rule.  For example, when Holtzoff objected to 
the imposition of written pleas because doing so would undermine a 
defendant’s right to make an oral plea, Robinson suspected that a different 
motive—prosecutorial efficiency—was at play:  “We want, of course, these 
rules to be fair to the Government.  At the same time they must be fair to the 
defendant.  We must have a balance between the two.  I think we all agree 
we do not want just speedy and quick convictions.”92 
As the first day of the full committee meeting progressed and Holtzoff 
resolutely engaged with each proposed rule, Robinson voiced his concerns 
that the effort to achieve parallelism was being frustrated.  “If we begin to 
leave a thing out as dealt with in the civil rules at one point and proceed to 
make our own rearrangement, we are going to get pretty far away from our 
plan of holding the two systems of rules pretty closely together.”93  In fact, 
Robinson’s edifice had sustained significant damage within the first hour, 
given that the committee rejected the proposed rule that would have anchored 
the criminal rules to the civil rules:  the conformity rule.  Once this rule was 
defeated, the parallelism envisioned by the first draft began to unravel. 
1.  The Conformity Rule (Proposed Rule 2) 
The first draft opened with a conformity rule, the heart of a unified code: 
Each of these Rules of Criminal Procedure which duplicates or which 
corresponds to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure bears the same rule 
number as the civil rule which it duplicates or to which it corresponds in 
title or in function.  The procedure under these rules is designed to conform 
as closely as possible to the procedure under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and these rules shall be construed with that purpose in view.94 
Robinson attempted not only to duplicate the civil code’s content but also 
to tie the interpretation of the criminal code to the civil code.  Under this rule, 
civil and criminal litigators would look across a more transsubstantive 
plane.95  This rule would constrain courts from distinguishing criminal from 
 
 92. Id. at 90–91. 
 93. Id. at 99.  The author has not yet determined to what plan Robinson referred—such 
as, for example, any discussions he had with principal committee members before he and his 
staff drafted the first set of rules. 
 94. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 2. 
 95. David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU 
L. REV. 1191, 1207–08 (“For some species of process law, trans-substantivity has long served 
as a central principle of doctrinal design.  This is so for evidence law.  Trans-substantivity’s 
persistence reflects the long-held belief, voiced prominently by John Henry Wigmore, that 
‘there is no occasion’ in evidence law ‘for a distinction’ among various types of cases.” 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 4 (1904))); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in 
Public Person Defamation Cases:  The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 
228 (1987) (“To fulfill its role in our legal system, procedure strives for fairness and efficiency.  
In a fair and efficient procedural system, the principal and valued features are accuracy in fact-
finding and rule application, minimum cost in both time and expense to the parties and the 
court system, and predictability for the participants.  These goals in turn support the 
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civil disputes and would prohibit courts from looking to other sources of law 
in interpreting the meaning of criminal rules.  The first civil discovery rules, 
for example, permitted parties to request documents “material” to the case—
the conformity rule would hitch the criminal code’s use of “material” to its 
meaning in the civil code.96 
Because Chairman Vanderbilt instructed the committee to address each 
rule in seriatim, the committee had addressed the most sweeping, 
controversial rule first—the conformity rule.  Holtzoff announced it “would 
be dangerous to tie” the two codes together, as other members raised more 
measured concerns.97  Professor Sheldon Glueck worried about adopting the 
civil code’s structure itself; he thought doing so would entail “too great [a] 
warping” of a criminal case’s existing chronology.98  Professor Herbert 
Wechsler wondered whether policies animating criminal and civil law were 
too different to share the same procedural backbone.99  Attorney George Z. 
Medalie observed that criminal courts had permitted some informality to 
persist and worried that tying criminal rules to civil rules might end this 
implicit agreement.100  With these unanswered questions hanging in the 
balance, Holtzoff nevertheless moved to strike the conformity rule, 
contending that civil rules constituted a thicket of technicalities that would 
undermine efficiency.101  His motion to cleave criminal from civil procedure 
and send civil and criminal litigation on different paths for generations 
carried without further discussion.102  This single, unexamined decision 
permitted a wedge to be driven between the two codes. 
In the absence of a conformity rule, courts interpreting criminal rules have 
looked to other sources of law for guidance in interpreting rules of criminal 
procedure, like postconviction standards, which typically impose quite 
limited obligations on the state.103  In contrast, terms like “relevant” and 
“material” that are used in civil procedure impute broad obligations.104  In 
the conformity rule’s absence, courts have explicitly adopted prudential 
principles that widen the procedural divide:  “As a matter of general 
 
development of trans-substantive procedure, for the substance-procedure dialectic involves 
much more than simple considerations of substance over form.”). 
 96. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1938) (amended 2007) (“Upon motion of any party showing good 
cause therefor and upon notice to all other parties . . . the court may order any party to permit 
the inspection and copying of [documents] . . . not privileged, which constitute or contain 
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in [the party’s] 
possession, custody, or control.” (emphasis added)). 
 97. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 22. 
 98. Id. at 17.  Chairman Vanderbilt thought it easy to integrate any procedures unique to 
criminal cases within the civil code’s organization, satisfying Glueck. Id. at 17–18. 
 99. Id. at 18. 
 100. Id. at 22–23.  
 101. Id. at 23. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Bulger, 928 F. Supp. 2d 305, 324 (D. Mass. 2013); United 
States v. Felt, 491 F. Supp. 179, 186 (D.D.C. 1979) (stating that materiality “has at times been 
interpreted to track closely with the constitutional standard”). 
 104. See Jordan Gross, An Ounce of Pretrial Prevention Is Worth More Than a Pound of 
Post-Conviction Cure:  Untethering Federal Pretrial Criminal Procedure from Due Process 
Standards of Review, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 317, 323 (2013). 
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construction ‘[t]he measure of discovery permitted by the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure is not intended to be as broad as in a civil case.’”105 
Dissolving the conformity rule that would have bound the two codes left 
Holtzoff free to pick and choose which civil rules to incorporate and how to 
interpret them.  Wechsler’s astute question regarding what policy objectives 
should inform the construction of the code was left unanswered.  In the 
absence of an overarching set of objectives, the rule creation exercise risked 
creating a code that favored one party over another.  The committee 
nevertheless moved on to the next set of proposed rules—the pleading rules. 
2.  Pleading 
Under civil rules, once a plaintiff files a complaint, the clerk issues a 
summons to be served on the defendant so as to provide notice of the 
dispute.106  This simple arrangement was met with Holtzoff’s approval, as a 
prosecutor might prefer the service of a complaint to the hassle of arrest.107  
When others suggested inserting language into the summons that would 
heighten notice, Holtzoff, having just portrayed the civil rules as a thicket of 
technicalities, turned to them for cover, saying:  “You do not have anything 
like that in civil summons.  I would like to see our criminal forms just as 
simple, if possible,”108 and “I think the clarity with which the civil rules were 
drawn is something to be admired.”109  Holtzoff did object to a provision 
permitting a court to “direct the clerk to issue a summons” on the grounds 
that such discretion should remain only with the prosecutor.110  Medalie 
thought judicial temperance might control the worst urges of junior 
prosecutors who were apt to “regard very petty offenses as being almost 
capital offenses.”111  “Some person with experience,” he noted, “should be 
with them to give them a word of caution.”112  However, Holtzoff thought 
any concerns of overreaching were best dealt with internally by the 
Department of Justice.113 
A keystone of civil procedure reform was to replace technical pleading 
requirements with “notice pleading.”  Notice pleading resisted any particular 
form and gave legs to potentially embryonic and murky allegations.114  
Contrary to its label, notice pleading promised defendants significantly less 
notice.  Robinson attempted to find a middle ground, rejecting the formalized 
and unyielding language of the common law but also building in a minimum 
 
 105. See United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 1975) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901, 915 (5th Cir. 1968)). 
 106. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 4. 
 107. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 45–46. 
 108. Id. at 48. 
 109. Id. at 50. 
 110. Id. at 52. 
 111. Id. at 53. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 52. 
 114. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 774 (2d Cir. 1944). 
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baseline of notice.115  Robinson defended his decision to deviate by a degree 
from the civil standard:  “You are stating the grounds for putting a man in the 
penitentiary.  There is nothing comparable to that in the civil rules.”116  
Holtzoff disagreed and advocated for the full embrace of notice pleading, 
again praising the civil code’s simplicity.117  Holtzoff thought that to “allege 
that the defendant murdered John Smith by a fatal gunshot wound” would be 
sufficient to advance to trial.118  With some concessions to Medalie and 
Frederick E. Crane, who thought a prosecutor should at least provide a 
“concise statement of facts,”119 Holtzoff persuaded others to adopt the civil 
rule in this instance.120  Importing notice pleading into criminal procedure 
had a significant consequence:  it dramatically lowered the entrance fee for 
the prosecutor. 
The question then would be whether, in exchange for easing the 
prosecutor’s burden to initiate litigation (and allowing less notice of the facts 
of the dispute), Holtzoff would consider a discovery phase to permit a 
defendant to review and test the factual basis for the state’s allegations.  
Holtzoff would not.  But before taking on the issue of discovery, the 
committee turned to civil reform’s construction of a pretrial motion practice 
that required written responses and deliberation, as opposed to existing 
practices that had permitted oral and spontaneous motions to flourish. 
3.  Pretrial Motion Practice 
The civil rules required written motions and notice of hearings, informing 
parties of the content of any motion and granting an opportunity to respond 
in writing and be heard.121  To Holtzoff, these requirements threatened to 
delay proceedings and impede prosecution.122  Holtzoff observed that rural 
courts ran through a docket in three days (day one, indictments; day two, 
 
 115. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 8.  Proposed Rule 8 
called for a “plain and concise statement” of (1) the court’s jurisdiction, (2) the source of the 
accusation (i.e., grand jury), (3) the defendant’s name, (4) the time of the offense, (5) the place 
of offense, (6) the act or omission that constitutes the offense, (7) any criminal intent, (8) the 
name of victim, (9) any other essential facts that provide important notice to defendant, and 
(10) the statute violated. Id.  The proposed rule further stated that “[n]o formal or additional 
allegations are required.” Id. 
 116. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 218. 
 117. Id. at 207. 
 118. Id. at 201. 
 119. Id. at 202, 205.  At the hearing, Medalie concurred that using the language “a concise 
statement of facts constituting the offense” was sufficient. Id. at 206.  Crane and Medalie’s 
suggestion was aimed at preventing an automatic filing of a bill of particulars that would 
require a concise set of facts anyway. Id. 
 120. Holtzoff stated, “We could adopt that language and require a short and plain statement 
of facts constituting the offense with which the defendant is charged.” Id. at 207.  Holtzoff 
may have added the last part—a short and plain statement of facts—to placate a member who 
advocated for such a rule.  In addition, Medalie thought a defendant should have some notice 
of the actual statute he allegedly violated; his wishes would be reflected in the resulting code. 
Id. at 211–12.  The chairman by fiat ultimately adopted Holtzoff’s version. Id. at 219. 
 121. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 6(d)–(e). 
 122. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 110.  This suggestion seemed to 
undermine one of the only explicit goals of the committee—to achieve a set of uniform rules. 
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pleas; day three, any trials) and did not reconvene for three months.123  He 
proposed leaving it to individual jurisdictions to impose or waive these 
requirements.  Here, Holtzoff sacrificed uniformity for efficiency.  When J.O. 
Seth wondered why a person indicted on a Monday should be convicted on 
Tuesday, Holtzoff maintained that accelerated dispositions protected 
defendants; otherwise, a defendant “might have to languish in jail for two or 
three months until the next term of court.”124  Seth found this feature of the 
system unacceptable, but Holtzoff assured him that Congress was “perfectly 
satisfied with” these circumstances.125 
Holtzoff also objected to a rule that all parties should be notified of any 
written motion.126  Though asserting a prosecutor should always receive 
notice, Holtzoff thought it the responsibility of codefendants to stay updated 
by reading local law journals.  Robinson worried that the failure to be 
informed of a hearing could harm a codefendant’s case and argued that all 
civil litigants were entitled to notice.  Holtzoff responded, “The civil rules 
are so different from criminal prosecutions . . . .  A civil case is a controversy 
between two private individuals, which is different from criminal 
procedure.”127  This observation seemed to support Robinson’s view that a 
criminal defendant who faced a loss of liberty should receive at least the same 
notice as a civil defendant.  But perhaps Holtzoff meant that a prosecutor, as 
minister of justice, would ensure that a hearing would be fair to all, rendering 
notice to codefendants unnecessary.  Holtzoff’s motion to strike the “notice 
of hearing” provision was met with a sea of ayes.128 
Holtzoff also objected to a provision giving the court the power to require 
that notice be sent to all parties.129  Holtzoff presumably viewed this 
arrangement as an unnecessary erosion of prosecutorial power.  Vanderbilt 
agreed with Holtzoff for other reasons.  He thought that a judge serving a 
short term should not make procedural decisions that would outlast his 
tenure.130  Robinson pushed back:  “When a man’s life or liberty is at stake, 
I do not think we ought to take [matters of judicial administration] into 
consideration.”131  Holtzoff responded, “We have to take the courts as we 
find them.”132  Robinson fired back, “We have to take the rights of defendants 
 
 123. Id. at 109. 
 124. Id. at 110. 
 125. Id. at 111. 
 126. Id. at 90–92; see also 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 5(a). 
 127. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 93. 
 128. Id. at 96. 
 129. Holtzoff was frequently on the alert for any language that indicated that a matter would 
proceed “by leave of court.”  For example, in proposed Rule 7(a)(1), if a defendant waived his 
right to an indictment, then “the attorney for the government may by leave of court proceed 
against the accused by information, or complaint.” 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
supra note 63, r. 7(a)(1).  Holtzoff sought to leave this matter purely in the hands of the 
prosecutor. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 147. 
 130. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 97–98. 
 131. Id. at 97. 
 132. Id. 
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as we find them.”133  Holtzoff’s view, however, resonated with the majority 
of members. 
As to the civil rule’s requirement that motions actually be in writing, 
Holtzoff thought doing so put oral motions under a cloud of illegitimacy.134  
Said Holtzoff, “I think that criminal practice is much more informal than civil 
procedure, and I do not think we want to make it any more formal or any 
more difficult.  I think our aim should be to simplify it rather than to 
complicate it.”135  Medalie agreed, asking, “What is the harm in granting 
motions without papers?” to which Holtzoff answered, “None at all.”136  To 
Holtzoff, even a rule that required a uniform caption page was 
objectionable—it signaled approval of a written tradition.  Holtzoff stated, 
“You do not need all that formality with papers in a criminal case. . . .  [W]e 
do not want to inject technicalities and formalities that do not now exist.”137  
Robinson bristled, “Do not let us use epithets like ‘technicalities and 
formalities.’”138  Where Robinson saw these civil rules provide notice and 
deliberation, Holtzoff saw new fronts open up for judicial incursion, 
distraction, and delay.139 
4.  Judicial Management of Pretrial Disputes 
Reform to civil procedure challenged assumptions about judicial neutrality 
by inviting a judge to put a thumb on a pretrial scale.140  By emboldening the 
judge, the civil rules built in a control rod to its new creation:  a party-driven 
system that afforded litigants with discovery powers, which could be misused 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 7.  Under proposed Rule 
7(b)(1), “[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made 
during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing” and “shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefor.” Id. 
 135. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 179–80.  Holtzoff would later write 
that common law pleading practice in the criminal law was formal and technical, as it required 
“useless and laborious learning” and “an incalculable amount of midnight oil” to solve the 
“futile problem of how an indictment should be drawn and what it should contain.” Alexander 
Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119, 124 (1944). 
 136. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 180. 
 137. Id. at 181–82. 
 138. Id. at 182. 
 139. See id.; see also 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 16. 
 140. See Charles E. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 163–
64 (1956) (noting that, following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Rule 16 in particular, “[p]re-trial procedure in this country came into its own,” giving the rules 
“wide appeal” and animating the “objectives of pre-trial”).  Presently, Rule 16(a) provides that 
the court “may order the attorneys” to appear for the purposes of “(1) expediting disposition 
of the action; (2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be 
protracted because of lack of management; (3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; (4) 
improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation; and (5) facilitating 
settlement.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a).  Furthermore, Rule 16(b)(3) requires a court to issue a 
scheduling order that controls the litigation and investigation, and Rule 16(c)(2) permits the 
court to simplify issues, eliminate claims or defenses, amend pleadings, obtain stipulations as 
to facts and admissibility, avoid unnecessary proof, determine the appropriateness of summary 
judgment, manage discovery and disclosures, identify witnesses and important documents, 
and set dates for discovery. Id. 16(b)–(c). 
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to harass opponents and delay proceedings.  An empowered judge could play 
referee and intervene.141  Charles Clark viewed judicial management as 
critical to individualizing a case, “so that [the case] may be separated for its 
own particular treatment from the vast grist of cases passing through our 
courts in daily routine toward negotiation and settlement and, occasionally, 
trial.”142  In attending to the need for efficiency, civil reformers considered 
what was lost by the mass processing of cases and sought to insert mitigation 
measures.  Clark’s observation exemplified a deep concern to achieve 
balance between competing aims of reform. 
The first draft of criminal procedure also envisioned judges climbing down 
into the pretrial trenches.143  Holtzoff viewed this as a threat to prosecutorial 
discretion, and he was not alone.  Medalie said, “I wonder how United States 
attorneys feel about this,” underscoring a sense of prosecutorial entitlement 
to pretrial territory.144  Committee members doubted that a judge would 
demand a pretrial conference in the absence of prosecutorial consent, and one 
member could not believe that a judge would tell a U.S. attorney to appear 
just so the judge could exert influence.145  The few civil litigators in the room 
disagreed—a judge could do exactly that.146  To this, even Robinson was 
skeptical:  “I doubt if the judge would do much of that in a criminal case.”147  
Medalie agreed, responding “No; [the judges would] not do it.”148  Still, 
Holtzoff thought ceding control to the court was ill-advised; a prosecutor 
should not “lose control of the calendar.”149 
Medalie also concluded that conferring power to a judge would be “a large 
profit . . . to the defendant.”150  Endemic of the committee’s failure to view 
each rule in isolation, the committee’s discussion of judicial incursion in 
pretrial proceedings was not anchored to any discussion of discovery.  Yet, 
in the absence of discovery, any concern about judicial overreaching would 
be rendered moot.  The committee amended the rule to permit a judge to 
invite parties for a pretrial consultation, to which a party could decline; later, 
the provision would be excised altogether.151  As a result, where civil rules 
establish a court’s “early and continuing control” of a case, criminal rules 
today provide for no pretrial judicial management.152  Consistent with 
 
 141. See Clark, supra note 140, at 164. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 16. 
 144. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 374. 
 145. See id. at 375. 
 146. See id. at 375–76. 
 147. Id. at 375. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 376. 
 150. Id. at 391. 
 151. The Supreme Court, in its final review of the proposed rules, would jettison the rule 
altogether. 
 152. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(2); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1 (providing the closest analogue to 
present-day Rule 16(a)(2)).  Rule 17.1 limits the court’s discretion to discussing a pretrial 
hearing only to “promote a fair and expeditious trial.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1.  Thus, it is rarely 
relevant and narrow in scope. 
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Holtzoff’s stated objectives, prosecutors now fill that vacuum and maintain 
control over the course of criminal cases. 
5.  Discovery 
Under common law, the pretrial exchange of information was exceptional.  
Civil reform turned this exception into the rule.  Civil reform introduced a 
new phase and changed the deep structure of litigation to pleading, discovery, 
and trial.153  To civil reformers, the rules created a system of checks and 
balances, with the discovery phase as the constant point of reference.154  
Without this phase, notice pleading provided too much leniency, and the 
objectives of individualizing lawsuits, exploring the merits, and preventing 
surprise at trial remained unfulfilled. 
The first draft of criminal procedure adopted the civil discovery phase 
almost whole cloth, integrating depositions, document requests, physical and 
mental examinations, and requests for admission.155  The draft included a 
rule giving a defendant the power to depose witnesses and permitted the 
defendant to ask questions “relevant to the subject matter.”156  Meanwhile, 
the rule conditioned the government’s right to take a deposition on a 
defendant deposing a “prospective witness for the government.”157  
Suggestions from the legal community revealed support for affording 
deposition power to criminal defendants.  For instance, representatives from 
the State Bar Association of Kansas thought that a defendant should be 
“permitted to take depositions on notice to the United States attorney ‘in the 
same manner as provided in the rules of civil procedure.’”158 
The committee’s discussion of this rule revealed fears that a defendant 
would use the deposition power to leave for China at the government’s 
expense and refuse to return, forcing extradition.159  In addition to worries 
about jailbreaks and witnesses relocating to Shanghai, some thought a 
defendant would misuse depositions to cause delay, while others worried that 
the government would misuse depositions to circumvent the Confrontation 
Clause.160  Some members thought that a deposition was only a vehicle to 
secure trial testimony, not a tool to investigate or test the credibility of an 
 
 153. See supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 155. 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 26–32 (depositions); id. r. 
34 (document requests); id. r. 35 (physical and mental examinations); id. r. 36 (requests for 
admissions).  Without explanation, interrogatories were excluded on the ground that such a 
tool could not be used in criminal proceedings. Id. r. 33 (“No criminal rule is proposed which 
is comparable to Civil Rule 33.”). 
 156. Id. r. 26. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 26 note. 
 159. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 418–19.  Crane, after discussing his 
concern about the defendant attempting to stay wherever he travelled to participate in the 
deposition, stated, “I should think he would be delighted to go [to China], as he gets out of jail 
and has a joy-ride and takes his lawyer along at the expense of his Government.” Id. at 419. 
 160. Id. at 419–20.  Some worried that the government would overuse depositions, though 
as Medalie pointed out, “Practically . . . the Government can examine anybody it wants to after 
indictment and before trial on whatever pretext it has.” Id. at 452. 
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opponent’s witnesses.  “Why should the defendant take the deposition of a 
witness who is likely to be a witness for the Government?” asked Holtzoff. 
He thought instead that “[t]he defendant would take the deposition of a 
witness who is likely to be a witness for himself.”161  Robinson pushed back, 
arguing that a defendant “wants to know what he is going to have to meet in 
court.”162  Medalie thought that if a witness is going to be available for trial, 
“there is no case made, under any principle of justice, for the taking of the 
deposition in advance of the trial, unless you want to try the whole case by 
deposition.”163  Robinson explained that in civil cases, “You want to find out 
what the other side is going to do on the trial.”164  But Crane retorted, “[T]hat 
is the trouble.  I think you have the idea of civil practice injected into the 
criminal procedure.”165  “To . . . go into the other side’s case to examine 
anybody . . . before trial,” he noted, “is a thing you would never think of in a 
criminal case.”166 
This exchange revealed that members, though seemingly aligned with 
Holtzoff, might have accepted the proposed rule.  When Wechsler expressed 
that the deposition rule as drafted was too disjointed,167 Medalie proposed 
the committee adopt the civil rule by reference.168  Robinson, rather than 
embrace an ally, took a self-defeating approach to express his brewing 
frustration and reminded Medalie that the committee had decided against 
referencing civil rules when it rejected the conformity rule.169  Medalie 
turned to Robinson: 
You talk very earnestly about having lawyers who do civil work do work 
in criminal cases.  I think that is a futile hope of yours, because of the 
mystery connected with criminal cases.  Still, I think it is a mighty good 
thing to have procedure the same in both branches of trial and litigated 
practice wherever possible; and here for the first time we have a definite 
opportunity to make the things about the same.170 
This was the first time that Medalie explicitly supported the integration of 
key civil rules.  The moment demonstrated Medalie’s political skills:  he 
expressed skepticism at the enterprise of a unified code while he advocated 
for the implementation of a paradigm-shifting civil rule.  Crane also seemed 
willing to import this centerpiece of civil reform, urging the committee to 
simplify the rules or just “[r]efer to the civil rules.”171  The issue, however, 
was tabled, and Holtzoff would volunteer himself to assist with the next draft 
of the rules.  The committee ultimately considered, after Holtzoff’s 
redrafting, a diluted deposition right; the revised rule limited the use of 
 
 161. Id. at 447. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 450–51. 
 164. Id. at 452. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 453. 
 167. See id. at 456–57. 
 168. Id. at 459. 
 169. Id. at 460. 
 170. Id. at 462. 
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depositions to prevent “a failure or delay of justice.”172  In subsequent drafts, 
erosion of the rule continued and, when the committee’s final draft was 
submitted to Congress in 1944, depositions were limited to those rare 
instances in which a witness would not be available for trial, a standard that 
effectively removed from criminal disputes the most powerful tool of pretrial 
investigation.173 
The first draft of criminal procedure also permitted document requests; 
specifically, upon a showing of good cause, the court could “order any party 
to produce and permit the inspection and copying” of documents or things 
“not privileged” that were “material” to the case.174  In introducing the rule, 
Robinson’s fatigue in swimming against the current was apparent: 
Here again you see an effort has been made to present to you a rule which 
would be adapted to criminal cases so far as possible in a comparative way 
with the civil rule 34 applying to civil cases.  Whether or not that is possible 
or practicable is for your consideration.  If you feel that discovery cannot 
be used in criminal cases, you may indicate that.175 
Holtzoff immediately moved to strike the rule, contending that this was “a 
one-sided proposition” and asking, “Am I right that this could operate only 
in favor of the defendant as against the Government and never in favor of the 
Government as against the defendant, because the defendant could always 
plead the privilege against self-incrimination?”176  Holtzoff instead proposed 
a rule that would condition a defendant’s access to government documents 
on a waiver of the self-incrimination privilege.  G. Aaron Youngquist was 
also opposed to the exchange of documents, as he suspected a defendant 
would use such information to fabricate a defense:  “If you disclose your 
evidence to the defendant, it gives him, if he be that kind of person, an 
opportunity to frame up a defense to meet it.”177 
Here, Medalie again aligned himself with Robinson’s cause and, this time, 
he dug in his heels.  The resulting discussion was rich.  To Holtzoff and 
Youngquist, Medalie said, “the truth ought to have no favorites.”178  Holtzoff 
responded: 
This is not only a question of producing the truth at the trial.  This is a way 
of getting a discovery before the trial and preparing evidence to meet it 
with, which means that unscrupulous defendants may fabricate evidence 
with which to meet the evidence that the Government is going to introduce 
at the trial.179 
 
 172. Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure 
for the District Courts of the United States r. 57(a) (Jan. 12, 1942) [hereinafter 1942 Draft 
Rules of Criminal Procedure] (tentative draft) (on file with author). 
 173. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (1944) (amended 1975, 1987, 2002, 2011). 
 174. 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 34. 
 175. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 465. 
 176. Id. at 465–66. 
 177. Id. at 466. 
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 179. Id. 
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Medalie was skeptical that a defendant could use government documents 
to fabricate evidence and thought any such attempt would backfire and aid in 
the conviction.180  Medalie indicated his comfort with constitutional 
protections, and, while conceding that they had some cost to the government, 
he thought that prosecutors would retain an advantage:  “you are practicing 
law now in criminal cases with that handicap for the Government.”181 
Holtzoff replied, “This is not a question of concealing the truth.  This is a 
question as to whether or not the [prosecutor’s] evidence should be revealed 
. . . before trial.”182  Medalie did not back down:  “What harm is there in 
knowing what the prosecutor knows?  It is the truth.”183 
Fellow committee member Gordon Dean agreed with Medalie, wondering 
why a defendant should not have a chance, in advance of trial, to consider the 
State’s evidence.184  Dean did not see a similar obligation on a defendant, 
who did not have a burden at trial.185  Medalie asserted that a prosecutor 
could, by any ready excuse, convene a grand jury to subpoena witnesses in 
preparation for trial.186  But Holtzoff continued to protest that there could be 
no discovery right afforded to a defendant in the absence of a reciprocal 
obligation.187  Medalie observed that Holtzoff was battling “something that 
is inherent in our whole system, and that is the privilege against self-
incrimination.”188  Medalie also pointed out that Holtzoff drew all his 
examples of perceived unfairness from corporate cases, where defendants 
hold most of the evidence and which were not representative of the ordinary 
cases in which the government has “far more than the defendant could 
get.”189 
Holtzoff moved to make a defendant’s request for documents conditional 
on waiving the right to self-incrimination.  This motion lost, though 
Youngquist stated, “I vote ‘no’ because I think we should not [permit a 
defendant access] at all,” to which Holzoff stated, “I am willing to go along 
with that.”190  A chorus of nays followed a chorus of ayes, so that motion lost 
as well.191  This standoff indicated that, with the leadership of a figure like 
Medalie, the committee could be persuaded to accept a regime that had 
concordance with the civil regime.  The standoff also revealed Holtzoff’s 
tenacity and singular purpose.  The committee’s second draft would retain 
the substance of Robinson’s proposal, but a “poison-pill” was added (likely 
by Holtzoff, who after the first meeting was authorized to participate in 
drafting), which read: 
 
 180. Id. at 471. 
 181. Id. at 467. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 467–68. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 468. 
 187. See id. at 468–70. 
 188. Id. at 470. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 472. 
 191. Id. at 473. 
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This rule is based on Civil Rule 34, but it is made considerably narrower 
than the latter.  The principal difference between the two is that in order to 
meet the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination it contains an 
express provision exempting the defendant from being required to produce 
any document or object if he alleges that the contents may tend to 
incriminate him. . . .  
It appears to the draftsman that the rule is somewhat futile in criminal cases, 
but is presented so that it may receive further consideration.192 
To Holtzoff, losing an argument was a momentary loss in a greater war. 
The final draft submitted to Congress more closely tracked Holtzoff’s 
preference that a defendant receive nothing from the State.  It only permitted 
a defendant access to documents that had belonged to the defendant but had 
been seized by the State—or, in other words, information of which the 
defendant was already aware.193  Overall, the robust discovery regime 
created in the first draft was severely curtailed.194  And due to this four-day 
meeting in September 1941, a criminal defendant, initially given agency to 
investigate and test the government’s case, was procedurally deemed a 
passive recipient of information that would be managed by the prosecutor.195 
C.  A New Code Based on the Old Code 
With Holtzoff’s influence, the second draft of criminal procedure hewed 
closely to common law procedure as it integrated a few civil rules—borrowed 
from rules of equity—that facilitated prosecution.196  In the introduction to 
the second draft considered by the advisory committee, Robinson noted that 
Holtzoff had “assisted in the revision of numerous rules,” attempting to keep 
 
 192. 1942 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 172, r. 56 note. 
 193. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (1944) (amended 1966, 1974, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1997, 
2002, 2013). 
 194. Meyn, Discovery and Darkness, supra note 7, at 1101 (observing that discovery under 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides only for limited disclosures). 
 195. See id.; see also 1941 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 63, r. 16. 
 196. This direction was consistent with the suggestions of Crane, Glueck, Holtzoff, and 
Chairman Vanderbilt. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 257. 
Mr. Glueck: I think that most of us visualize this whole business as an orderly 
process, having certain traditional steps, and I think it might help 
if . . . some stress were placed on a chronological order of the 
subjects. 
Mr. Crane: I agree with that.  
Mr. Holtzoff: I do not think, when we have the final draft, we need follow the 
numbering of the civil rules. 
Id.  Vanderbilt expressed that the committee could rearrange the structure and, if need be, 
reference any integration of the civil code to “accomplish what the reporter had in mind.” Id. 
at 258. Compare CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (AM. LAW. INST. 1931) (structuring the Table 
of Contents as:  Arrest, Preliminary Examination, Bail, Grand Jury, Indictment and 
Information, Arraignment, Pleas, Jurisdiction and Venue, Trial), with 1942 Draft Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, supra note 172 (structuring the Table of Contents as:  General Provisions; 
Preliminary Warrant or Summons, Hearing, and Bail; Indictment and Information; 
Arraignment, Pleas, Motions, and Notices; Trial). 
2017] CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 725 
the rules brief and simple and “to facilitate the functioning of the trial as a 
method for determining the truth about an issue which is in controversy.”197   
This sixth draft was the first to be publicly distributed, and it bore little 
relationship to civil procedure.198  Articles authored by committee members 
that praised the reform were published contemporaneous with the draft’s 
public debut.199  Robinson acknowledged that the committee had considered 
civil procedure as a template, but as a team player, he portrayed civil reform 
as incompatible.  He wrote that the committee had determined that “the 
possibilities of adapting the civil rules . . . as the basis or model of 
organization or of content for the criminal rules were limited and 
unpromising, except in isolated instances.”200  Meanwhile, Holtzoff’s 
analysis was triumphant: 
The principal significance of the new federal criminal rules is found in the 
attempt to reform procedure and to make far-reaching improvements as 
they appeared necessary.  Existing procedure has been simplified and 
numerous outmoded technicalities that originated several centuries ago 
have been eliminated.  Many of these technicalities were the culmination 
of humanitarian efforts to ameliorate the rigors of the criminal law at a time 
when it was almost savage in its ferocity.  Today they are meaningless and 
arouse risibility.  The simplification of procedure has been accomplished, 
however, without sacrifice of any safeguards that properly surround a 
defendant in a criminal case.  In fact, in some respects the new rules have 
cemented and strengthened the protection accorded to the defendant.201 
In December 1944, the rules of criminal procedure were sent to Congress 
for authorization.202  The final draft retained common law’s deep structure of 
pleading and trial.  Yet the new code dramatically eased the prosecutor’s 
journey from pleading to trial.  The prosecutor now faced a forgiving 
pleading standard, which only required a “plain, concise and definite written 
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”203  The new 
code adopted other equitable rules, including the liberal joinder of claims and 
parties, which eased the prosecutor’s ability to consolidate felonies and 
misdemeanors that were based on “transactions connected together or 
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.”204  Rejecting a discovery 
 
 197. 1942 Draft Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 172 (letter from James J. 
Robinson to members of the advisory committee). 
 198. See Holtzoff, supra note 135, at 123.  
 199. See generally id.; George F. Longsdorf, The New Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 18 J. ST. B. CAL. 263 (1943); Lester B. Orfield, The Preliminary Draft of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 22 TEX. L. REV. 37 (1943); Robinson, supra note 51, at 
39, 44; Arthur T. Vanderbilt, New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure, 6 TEX. B.J. 300 
(1943). 
 200. Robinson, supra note 51, at 43. 
 201. Holtzoff, supra note 135, at 123. 
 202. Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S., to the 
Honorable Francis Biddle, Attorney Gen. of the U.S. (Dec. 26, 1944), in 327 U.S. 823 (1945). 
 203. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (1944) (amended 1966, 1972, 1979, 1987, 2000, 2002, 2009). 
 204. Id. 3 (amended 1972, 1993, 2002, 2011) (drafting the complaint); id. 4 (amended 1966, 
1974, 1987, 1993, 2002, 2011) (serving the complaint); id. 8(a) (amended 2002) (“Two or 
more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for 
each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the 
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phase, the final draft of criminal procedure preserved the pretrial lacuna 
between pleading and trial that characterized common law disputes.  
Depositions were limited to those rare instances in which trial testimony 
would otherwise be lost.205 
This absence of a discovery phase provided prosecutors with both front-
end gains (given that the complaint required little, and a defendant had no 
power to factually challenge the allegations) and back-end gains (given that 
the prosecutor could motivate a plea through the strategic release of 
information and an inflated trial threat, as the prosecutor remained fairly 
insulated from motions in limine due to the defendant’s denial of access to 
the state’s witnesses).206  Though Robinson’s first draft contemplated the 
judge mediating pretrial disputes (an intervention that would anyway be 
minimized by the eradication of a discovery phase),207 the Supreme Court, 
before sending the final iteration to Congress, struck the provision 
altogether.208  Throwing a bone to the traditionalists, the final draft integrated 
the constitutional standards commonly included in treatises on common law 
procedure, providing guidance as to grand jury proceedings, arraignment, and 
the preliminary hearing.209  The new template had become the old template, 
but it had been modified to further facilitate prosecutorial intentions.  As 
Charles Clark had warned, a reform effort that favored existing rules risked 
being retrogressive.210  Whereas reform to civil procedure set in motion a 
new way of resolving disputes, criminal procedure froze in time and 
protected existing hierarchies.  The differences between civil and criminal 
practice, once small, became a yawning gap. 
IV.  POSTMORTEM ANALYSIS 
Was the adoption of Holtzoff’s view inevitable?  Could the committee 
have adopted Robinson’s draft?  A dissection of the committee’s meetings 
helps to illuminate what happened.  But why the committee did what it did 
remains unknown.  Some preliminary observations, set forth in this Part, 
 
same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or 
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.”); id. 12 
(amended 1974, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2002, 2014) (raising defenses); id. 14 (amended 1966, 
2002) (addressing joinder issues). 
 205. Id. 15(a) (amended 1974, 1987, 2002, 2011). 
 206. A preliminary hearing provides a check, though a weak one, designed to ensure that 
the defendant committed a felony so that detaining the defendant pending trial comports with 
due process. See Meyn, Unbearable Lightness, supra note 7, at 61–62. 
 207. See Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Rules 
of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States r. 15 (May 1942), in 1 
MADELEINE J. WILKEN & NICHOLAS TRIFFIN, DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 60–61 (1991). 
 208. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (1944). 
 209. Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Rules of 
Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States r. 5, in 1 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, 
supra note 207, at 46 (arrest); id. r. 6, in 1 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 207, at 48 
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proceedings); id. r. 11, in 1 WILKEN & TRIFFIN, supra note 207, at 56 (warrant or summons 
and bail upon indictment or information). 
 210. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
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provide insight into the dynamics that influenced the committee’s decision to 
reject Robinson’s vision and adopt rules rooted in the past. 
A.  Holtzoff at the Helm and an Amenable Crew 
One wonders whether, in Holtzoff’s absence, Robinson would have 
accomplished a result that bore a closer resemblance to civil procedure.  
Holtzoff dominated meetings to exert a singular influence, pronouncing 
opinions that had the quality of well-wrought judicial decrees.211  Holtzoff 
was intimately involved in legislative affairs in his supervisory role within 
the Department of Justice and, during the pendency of committee meetings, 
worked with congressional leaders to secure an amendment that would 
broaden the committee’s influence and, consequently, his.212  His position 
held sway with others, and even today, reading from a flat transcript, Holtzoff 
flies off the page as relentless.  If Holtzoff’s portrayal of the civil rules was 
in constant flux, he was consistent in constructing rules that preserved 
prosecutorial discretion and facilitated the quick resolution of criminal 
disputes.  Members like Youngquist, Crane, and Glueck appeared 
predisposed to such an endeavor.  Yet when Medalie took on Holtzoff, 
Medalie could expect to persuade other members.  These interventions, 
however infrequent, reveal that committee members held diverse views.  At 
the same time, it was equally true that members often seemed amenable to 
Holtzoff’s positions. 
A deep bench of current and former prosecutors provides one explanation 
for the committee’s bias toward rules that facilitated prosecution.  The 
committee did not seem to be aware of this overrepresentation.  In a postgame 
talk at the Catholic University School of Law on October 16, 1945, Chairman 
Vanderbilt informed his audience that the committee had been composed of 
“judges and former judges, prosecutors, district attorneys, . . . defense 
counsel, [and] representatives of the Department of Justice.”213  Robinson 
likewise touted the committee’s diversity, observing that the members came 
from numerous states and included professors, judges, “federal and state 
district attorneys, . . . assistant attorneys general, . . . defense counsel, [and] 
 
 211. In a few instances, fellow committee members revealed irritation with Holtzoff’s 
recall of facts and law.  For example, where Medalie thought he was correcting Holtzoff by 
saying that federal banks were closed on state holidays, Holtzoff stated:   
I know.  The rule as to banks is this—a bank can close on any day on which you 
cannot present negotiable paper under the laws of the state; that is, where you cannot 
present negotiable paper on a state holiday; and that is why even federal banks close 
on state holidays. 
Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 106–07.  Medalie responded, “We have solved 
the mystery.” Id. at 107.  Holtzoff would find his rightful place at the bench when President 
Harry S. Truman named him to a seat on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
in 1945.  See Holtzoff, Alexander, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/holtzoff-alexander [https://perma.cc/YF6N-F4FV] (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 212. See Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 40–41. 
 213. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Preparation of the Rules, Their Adoption by the Supreme Court 
and Submission to Congress, 5 F.R.D. 90, 92 (1945). 
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lawyers in the general practice of law.”214  Former Attorney General Homer 
Cummings was even more generous, contending that the committee had 
acted as a mere conduit for ideas, apparently free of any bias.215 
Yet, of the members who had criminal law experience, it was mostly 
prosecutorial in nature.  Holtzoff served in the Department of Justice’s 
leadership as special assistant to the U.S. attorney general.216  Robinson 
served as a prosecutor in Indiana.217  Medalie served twenty years as a 
prosecutor—as a district attorney, a deputy state attorney general, and as the 
U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York.218  Tolman was a special 
attorney at the Department of Justice.219  Gordon Dean was the Department 
of Justice’s criminal division chief.220  Judge Crane had served as assistant 
district attorney in New York and was later considered by the Coolidge 
administration for the position of U.S. attorney general.221  Youngquist 
served as attorney general of Minnesota and an assistant U.S. attorney—his 
journal entries revealed an impulse to join raids on dens of gangsters.222  
Burke served as the prosecuting attorney in Michigan, was a member of the 
Michigan Crime Commission, and ran for state attorney general.223  Dession 
had a short stint at the state’s attorney’s office in Middlesex County, 
Connecticut.224  Wechsler had served as an assistant attorney general.225  
 
 214. Robinson, supra note 51, at 44. 
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Seth appears to have had some experience as a prosecutor.226  As to the 
remaining members, Glueck227 and Wechsler228 had not strayed from the 
academy, and Vanderbilt,229 McClellan,230 Longsdorf,231 and Seasongood232 
were immersed in civil practice. 
Missing from this list was a criminal defense attorney.  Some members, 
during periods of private practice, may have represented criminal defendants.  
But, with the exception of Medalie and Youngquist, no member indicated 
any such experience during committee deliberations.233  Moreover, no one 
noted the absence of a defense attorney on the committee.234  And Judge 
Crane felt quite at ease in expressing his dim view of the criminal defense 
bar.235 
 
 226. Seth, however, seemed mostly engaged in civil matters, as he was at the center of 
transactions that ran the gamut from negotiating water disputes with Colorado and Texas as 
New Mexico’s representative to assisting Georgia O’Keeffe with securing tax benefits. See 
Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 114 (noting Seth’s work as a prosecutor); 
NANCY HOPKINS REILY, GEORGIA O’KEEFFE, A PRIVATE FRIENDSHIP 366 (2007); Water Law, 
MONTGOMERY & ANDREWS L. FIRM http://montand.com/practice-area/water-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/8U7S-8M54] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
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TIMES, Mar. 13, 1980, at 86. 
 228. See Tamar Lewin, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Giant, Is Dead at 90, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
28, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/28/us/herbert-wechsler-legal-giant-is-dead-at-
90.html [https://perma.cc/846X-K6ZR]. 
 229. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 230. See Boston Judge Rules Out Wire Tapping Evidence, LEWISTON DAILY SUN, May 12, 
1938; McLellan, Hugh Dean, FED. JUD. CTR, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/mclellan-
hugh-dean [https://perma.cc/LJ5R-G8YU] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
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over it.” Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 250.  Judge Crane added that criminal 
law “is not like the civil end of it.  It is rough business, much of it, in these great big cities.  
You get a lot of lawyers who are as bad as the defendants.” Id. 
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The institutional alignment with prosecutorial agencies in fact went 
deeper.  Robinson created his support staff with the cooperation of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, Offices of the Assistant U.S. Attorney, and the 
National Association of U.S. Attorneys, all of which loaned attorneys to the 
effort.236  In addition, a key staff member who sat in on meetings was Fred 
E. Strine, who served in the criminal division of the Department of Justice.237  
Drafts passed through two committees:  one was composed of federal judges, 
and the other, called the Department of Justice Committee, was led by 
Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge.238  Robinson noted that the 
approval of these committees conferred legitimacy to the effort.239  The 
committee’s final draft relied on 
recommendations of Attorneys General of the United States with respect to 
criminal procedure, as contained in annual reports of the Attorneys General 
during the past fifty years . . . [as well as] recommendations with respect to 
criminal procedure which have been made by the crime surveys, namely, 
the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement.240 
The institutional alignment among the committee members and support 
staff did not make the result inevitable.  Robinson and his staff, however 
oriented toward law and order, proposed a code that hewed closely to the 
civil rules.  Medalie, with deep ties to state and federal prosecutorial offices, 
at times opposed Holtzoff.  The debate among committee members was at 
times robust. 
Indeed, Medalie and Holtzoff engaged in a rich discussion over whether 
defendants should have access to the government’s documents, which 
momentarily persuaded others to block Holtzoff’s effort to do away with the 
rule.241  One wonders, had members of the defense bar been represented, 
whether compromises would have been made that otherwise were not.  It is 
one thing to be amenable to a point of view, but it is another thing to have 
had an experience that engenders a visceral sense of what is at stake.  The 
fact that there was at times robust debate despite institutional homogeneity 
highlights the reasonableness of the initial draft’s approach.  With Holtzoff 
at the opposition’s helm, the committe may have required the input of those 
with a fundamentally different experience to represent and draw out 
competing views. 
B.  The Gravitational Pull of Existing Practices 
Robinson estimated that 95 percent of the rules in the draft released to the 
public represented existing practices, whereas “not over 5 percent . . . can be 
 
 236. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Lester B. Orfield, Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 24 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 315, 318 n.18 (1949). 
 238. See Robinson, supra note 51, at 44. 
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 240. Id. at 42. 
 241. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
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considered to be substantially new provisions.”242  The rules, observed 
Robinson, were not characterized by any “zeal to reform present 
procedure.”243  Holtzoff agreed: 
[T]he approach of the Committee has been of a conservative nature.  The 
existing practice on each point was ascertained and modifications were 
made in it only in those instances in which it affirmatively appeared that an 
improvement was needed.  The attitude of the Committee was not 
iconoclastic but, on the contrary, its mode of operation was to build on 
existing foundations.244 
This was in stark contrast to the views of Charles Clark, who led the civil 
reform effort and warned:  “Experience teaches us, that . . . the general 
professional reaction is, quite naturally, against change. . . .  [A] reform of 
procedure which merely adjusts itself to the majority view of the bar at best 
can be only a minor readjustment, perhaps even harmful.”245  Clark was not 
the only commentator to express these concerns.  Said E.J. McDermott, “[I]t 
is not only necessary to make the need of reform clear, but the need of it must 
be incessantly dinned into the ears of the lawyers . . . until public opinion 
becomes so distinct and strong that dull, conceited or stubbornly conservative 
lawyers can not resist it.”246 
But the committee ultimately took the path Clark sought to avoid.  The 
gang of four—Holtzoff, Youngquist, Crane, and Glueck—all sought to 
repackage existing rules.  Glueck believed a unified code would entail “too 
great [a] warping” of the existing chronology.247  Glueck did not question 
whether the existing chronology of criminal procedure was necessary, nor 
did he articulate how the civil rules would actually disrupt the existing 
chronology (which arguably could coexist).248  And, as to any disruption, 
Glueck did not articulate why Robinson’s proposed path was not an 
improvement.249 
In embracing existing practices, the committee vaunted the code’s 
simplicity.  Dession noted that the entire code, from complaint through 
appeal, was “sixty small pages of large print” and that, reduced to a pocket 
edition, “would take up no more space than a box of matches.”250  But this 
simplicity reflected the omission of a discovery phase.  Members reasoned 
that a discovery phase was unnecessary, that trial would compensate for its 
 
 242. Id. at 42–43 (explaining that the sources of criminal procedure reform included 
“federal and state constitutions and statutes, the common law at various periods in the legal 
history of the United States, of the states and of England, the decisions of federal, state and 
English courts, the rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court and by other federal 
courts, and the traditional details of practice and of administrative procedure which are not to 
be found in written or printed form”). 
 243. Id. at 43. 
 244. Holtzoff, supra note 135, at 139. 
 245. Clark & Moore, supra note 23, at 390. 
 246. McDermott, supra note 22, at 358. 
 247. Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 74, at 17. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See id. 
 250. Dession, supra note 34, at 694. 
732 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
absence,251 and that a “witness upon the stand is far superior to his 
deposition.”252 
The committee’s embrace of existing practices was consistent with a 
historical resistance to considering the rights of a criminal defendant.  Jerome 
Hall viewed the historical development of criminal procedure to ever so 
slowly recognize a role for defendants within a process that presumed 
guilt.253  Procedure initially permitted guilt to be determined by ordeal where 
procedure and evidence were inextricable—where procedure itself, drowning 
or being burned by hot irons, revealed evidence of culpability.  As the law of 
procedure became distinct from evidence, the defendant’s role continued to 
be minimal.  Procedure permitted a trial and the presentation of evidence, but 
it did not provide a means for a defendant to question witnesses.254  The 
defendant’s role slowly increased over centuries, as he eventually became 
entitled to a public trial and could confront witnesses.255  The criminal 
defendant, relative to other litigants, however, continued playing a lesser 
role; as of Hall’s writing in 1942, states were still debating whether a criminal 
defendant was entitled to object to defects in an indictment.256  To Hall, 
tradition—the “deep imprint of professional methods, and most of all, the 
existing range of thought and evaluation”—imposed “rigorous limitations on 
actual deliberate change.”257  Hall and Robinson’s efforts to transform 
criminal procedure met a tradition of resistance.  As Holtzoff had observed, 
ignoring the counterexample provided by civil procedure reform, “The only 
time we run any risk of rejection [of a proposed rule] is when we change the 
practice.”258 
C.  Missing Objectives, but Also Hidden Objectives 
Unlike Robinson, who provided a rationale for his first draft, Holtzoff 
never explicitly proposed a rationale to guide the committee’s review.  
Indicative of this failure, the Supreme Court denied the committee’s first 
request to distribute a draft to the public because the Court was unable to 
understand the rules’ “true purport and the nature of the problems which they 
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are thought to solve.”259  The absence of a clear rationale was evident when 
at the start of the first meeting of the full committee, Wechsler stated: 
The object of [the conformity rule, Rule 2,] is to secure interpretation in 
accordance with the interpretation of the civil rules and presumably to 
incorporate into the interpretative job here the policies that achieve 
dominance in the work on the civil rules.  Now, without expressing a 
judgment as to whether that is wise or unwise, because I do not know 
enough about the civil rules and the grim detail that they present, 
nevertheless a priori it seems to me to be questionable, because we are 
dealing with situations in criminal cases in which the dominant policies 
may well be different.260 
Wechsler’s objection is well taken; a committee charged with drafting a 
procedural code should agree on, or at least discuss, its objectives.  His 
observation revealed that the committee had not discussed its values.  
Vanderbilt had instructed the committee to start with Rule 1 and continue in 
seriatim.261  No space was carved out to accommodate a broader discussion 
that would attend to Wechsler’s concerns. 
In the absence of any explicit, guiding principles, various members 
announced that criminal law was just different.  Vanderbilt stated “that the 
problems of criminal law . . . are quite different from some of the problems 
of civil law.”262  Holtzoff added, 
I am impressed very much with the fact that the problems of criminal 
procedure are so different, the work in criminal cases so different from 
trying a civil case, that it would be dangerous to tie the criminal rules too 
strongly to the civil rules, either textually or by rule of construction.263 
Absent, however, was the rationale for this perceived difference.  Holtzoff 
did later elaborate on the philosophy that had guided his approach.  After the 
draft was distributed to the public, he asserted that the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 
[i]n a larger sense . . . must necessarily crystallize a philosophy of 
administration of criminal justice. . . .  [I]t must be conducive to a simple, 
effective, and expeditious prosecution of crimes.  Perpetrators of crimes 
must be detected, apprehended and punished.  The conviction of the guilty 
must not be unduly delayed.  Criminals should not go unwhipped of justice 
because of technicalities having no connection with the merits of the 
accusation.  The protection of the law-abiding citizen from the ravages of 
the criminal is one of the principal functions of government.  Any form of 
criminal procedure that unnecessarily hampers and unduly hinders the 
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successful fulfillment of this duty must be discarded or radically 
changed.264 
The full committee may not have agreed with this approach.  Yet, sub 
silentio, this view of criminal procedure’s purpose drove reform. 
Given that the first draft incorporated the civil rules, it is not unreasonable 
to think that the committee might have submitted a unified code to the 
Supreme Court.  The confluence of circumstances, a dogged effort by 
Holtzoff, an institutionally aligned committee, a gravitation toward existing 
practices, and an unexpressed, powerful set of objectives may have 
contributed to the formation of a code that stands in stark contrast to the 
neutrality achieved by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Reformers of federal civil procedure provided a new roadmap for litigation 
in the United States in 1938.265  Merging law and equity, the code simplified 
pleading, permitted joinder of multiple claims and parties, empowered parties 
to investigate their cases, and invited courts to influence a lawsuit’s 
development.  The reform’s sweeping changes received widespread 
acceptance and broadly influenced state codes.266  It was in this atmosphere 
of reassessment and innovation that a newly appointed advisory committee 
charged with reforming the rules of criminal procedure considered whether 
all disputes, civil and criminal, might be governed by a unified code. 
The potential impact of a unified code would have been far reaching.  No 
longer a passive participant, a criminal defendant would be procedurally 
assigned a role to investigate the case, thereby vesting him with agency in a 
dispute.  The integration of a robust discovery phase would permit 
opportunities to test the integrity of allegations in the absence of a trial.  The 
invitation of judicial management would further disrupt prosecutorial 
control.  Such a model would achieve some balance between the aims of 
efficiency and accuracy.  At the same time, a unified code of procedure would 
presumably increase prosecutorial drag.  In the context of mass incarceration, 
however, this eventuality might be viewed as a benefit rather than a cost. 
Led by Holtzoff, the reform of criminal procedure integrated civil rules 
that increased efficiency, like notice pleading and liberalized joinder, but 
rejected countermeasures designed to ensure accuracy, like judicial 
intervention and discovery tools.  In this way, the committee did not actually 
integrate aspects of the civil code but instead created an entirely different 
code with new dynamics.  Holtzoff’s gravitation toward a stripped-down 
criminal code stemmed from his belief that the criminal justice system had 
become fair and just.  He believed that the common law technicalities had 
served their function, which was “to ameliorate the rigors of the criminal law 
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at a time when it was almost savage in its ferocity.”267  Holtzoff thought such 
cruelties of the criminal law had been cured by evolving standards and the 
professionalization of law enforcement.268  A few years after Holtzoff’s 
assertion of faith in the criminal justice system, President Harry S. Truman 
convened a commission that issued a report on the state of civil rights that 
catalogued police terror and injustice in the courtroom: 
[A defendant] sometimes finds that the judicial process itself does not 
give him full and equal justice.  This may appear in unfair and perfunctory 
trials, or in fines and prison sentences that are heavier than those imposed 
on other members of the community guilty of the same offenses.  In part, 
the inability of the Negro, Mexican, or Indian to obtain equal justice may 
be attributed to extrajudicial factors.  The low income of a member of any 
one of these minorities may prevent him from securing competent counsel 
to defend his rights.  It may prevent him from posting bail or bond to secure 
his release from jail during trial.  It may predetermine his choice, upon 
conviction, of paying a fine or going to jail.  But these facts should not 
obscure or condone the extent to which the judicial system itself is 
responsible for the less-than-equal justice meted out to members of certain 
minority groups.269 
Holtzoff seemed insulated from a growing consciousness regarding police 
misconduct, a burgeoning list of new crimes that expanded prosecutorial 
discretion, and the salience of race and class to outcomes in the criminal 
justice system.270  Despite writing at the height of Jim Crow, Holtzoff 
thought that “[c]riminals should not go unwhipped of justice because of 
technicalities” and believed procedures that slowed criminal law outcomes 
were “meaningless and arouse[d] risibility.”271  Holtzoff’s belief in system-
wide integrity helps explain why he took the positions he did in constructing 
the criminal procedural code.  Today, his vision remains baked in. 
Over the course of four days, the committee made decisions that directly 
contributed to the perceived differences between civil and criminal matters.  
Indicative of how Holtzoff began to hammer a wedge between criminal and 
civil practice, the few civil litigators appointed to the committee began to feel 
more and more excluded.  By the second day, Longsdorf, a civil litigator who 
should have felt qualified to participate given the nature of Robinson’s first 
draft, stated, “I have not any experience in criminal practice, which raises a 
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good deal of doubt as to whether I ought to be here.”272  As Holtzoff cleaved 
the criminal rules from civil rules, Longsdorf felt less and less relevant, 
indicative of Robinson’s fear that segregating procedure would segregate 
litigators and create two different worlds.273  It has. 
But it did not have to, as the origin story of criminal procedure reveals.  
Rather, the current iteration of criminal procedure was the alternative.  The 
first draft, and its full integration of civil rules, was created over a span of six 
months by Robinson and his team through intensive study and collaboration 
with members of the legal establishment.  However, Holtzoff, by force of 
personality, altered the anticipated course of criminal procedure.  This 
revelation invites a reexamination of the prevailing view that procedural 
differences in criminal and civil disputes are inevitable, or for that matter, 
appropriate. 
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